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Congress regularly enacts legislation providing for redundant 
administrative programs.  For example, there are more than one hundred 
federal programs for surface transportation, eighty-two programs to ensure 
teacher quality, eighty programs to promote domestic economic development, 
and forty-seven programs to provide employment and job-training services.  
Recent high-profile legislation – such as the financial-industry reform measure 
and the health care reform measure – add new programs without repealing 
existing ones directed at the same policy goals.  Prior academic analyses 
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generally have not considered why Congress pursues redundancy.  This Article 
addresses that question through both theoretical and institutional analysis.   
The Article first constructs an organizational theory that attributes 
redundancy in administrative programs to the congressional committee system.  
Specifically, the Article demonstrates that two critical components of the 
existing committee system – fragmented jurisdictions and parliamentary 
prerogatives – systematically bias legislative outcomes in favor of redundancy.  
Building on leading theoretical accounts of congressional committees from 
political science, the Article then presents a cost-benefit analysis of this 
tendency toward redundancy.  It shows that redundancy allows legislators to 
increase distributive favors for constituents and interest groups but that 
redundancy is also linked to the desirable pursuit of informational efficiency.  
Thus, the institutional structures facilitating redundancy have mixed effects. 
Consequently, the Article describes and analyzes specific institutional 
reforms that trade off these distributive costs and informational benefits.  One 
approach would subject more legislative decisions to external advisory 
processes such as that used to close unneeded military facilities.  A second and 
more promising approach would preserve existing committee jurisdictions but 
would scale back committees’ parliamentary prerogatives, thereby 
encouraging redundancy in program design but discouraging redundancy in 
program implementation.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses the puzzle of federal legislation that establishes and 
maintains redundant administrative programs.  When pursuing a policy 
objective, Congress seldom uses a single program administered by a single 
agency.  A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued in early 
2011 identified program redundancy in the areas of “agriculture, defense, 
economic development, energy, general government, health, homeland 
security, international affairs, and social services.”1  The report found that the 
federal government currently has more than one hundred programs concerning 
surface transportation, eighty-two programs to ensure teacher quality, eighty 
programs to promote domestic economic development, and forty-seven 
 
1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE 
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE 
REVENUE 2 (2011) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].  The report is the first annual report under 
section 21 of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, which states that the  
Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office shall conduct routine 
investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative 
goals and activities within Departments and governmentwide and report annually to 
Congress on the findings, including the cost of such duplication and with 
recommendations for consolidation and elimination to reduce duplication identifying 
specific rescissions. 
Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 8 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 712 note). 
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programs to provide employment and job-training services.2  More than a 
dozen federal agencies share responsibility for food safety,3 and seven agencies 
work to meet the water needs of the U.S.-Mexico border region.4  Eight 
different cabinet departments maintain a total of eighty programs to provide 
transportation services to individuals,5 and, in the recent past, the government 
maintained more than 125 federal programs to assist families with children.6 
Although Congress has long been aware of pervasive redundancy,7 it has 
continued the trend in recent legislation.  Despite sharp criticism that 
regulatory fragmentation and overlap contributed to the recent crisis in the 
financial-services industry, the financial reform measure passed by Congress in 
2010 added to the redundancy by layering new agencies and programs on old 
ones.8  The health care reform legislation, also passed in 2010, followed the 
same approach.  Federal law already provided numerous programs for the 
delivery of health care to different segments of the population; the new 
legislation left those programs largely in place and added ambitious new 
programs to the mix.9  And the increased attention over the last decade to 
federal counter-terrorism efforts has produced a bewildering amount of 
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in executive agencies and 
administrative programs.10 
Administrative redundancy is particularly prominent in fiscal policy.  
Congress often channels duplicative subsidies to favored activities and 
 
2 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 42-45, 48-49, 140-41, 144-47. 
3 Id. at 8; see also Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food 
Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 90-92 (2000). 
4 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.  
5 Id. at 135. 
6 DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 
140-41 (1997). 
7 See, e.g., Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation in Government Programs: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
William Roth, Chairman, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs) (discussing GAO findings 
that “despite efforts to downsize, streamline, and reinvent the Federal bureaucracy, massive 
duplication, overlap, and fragmentation remain rampant throughout the government”). 
8 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964-65 (2010) (creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection). 
9 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§§ 1321-22, 124 Stat. 119, 186-92 (providing for, among other new programs, “health 
insurance exchanges” under state control); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act). 
10 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1660-73 (2006) 
(analyzing fragmentation in U.S. intelligence); Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden 
World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST,  July 19, 2010, at A-1. 
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industries through a combination of direct-spending and tax-expenditure 
programs.  The GAO reported that, for fiscal year 2009, Congress maintained 
“a total of 173 tax expenditures, some of which were of the same magnitude or 
larger than related federal spending for [particular] mission areas.”11  
Agriculture, education, and poverty relief, for example, receive extensive 
federal assistance both through annual appropriations and through preferential 
tax rules.12  In other cases, Congress provides redundant subsidies through 
overlapping spending programs (without corresponding tax expenditures) or 
overlapping tax expenditures (without corresponding spending programs).  
Whatever the medium, one is not hard pressed in reviewing the federal budget 
to find correlatives among the many appropriations, entitlements, and tax 
expenditures.  Why does Congress do this?  Why does Congress pursue its 
policy objectives through legislation that generates, preserves, or increases 
administrative redundancy?13 
Academic accounts generally have ignored that basic question and, instead, 
have examined redundancy exclusively as a normative matter.  The dominant 
position in the academic literature argues that policymakers should reduce 
redundancy as much as possible.  Milton Friedman, for example, maintained 
that government could provide less expensive and more effective poverty relief 
by collapsing its overlapping anti-poverty programs into cash grants to the 
poor.14  Similarly, legal scholars have long debated the choice between direct-
spending programs and tax-expenditure programs as interchangeable policy 
 
11 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 75. 
12 Thus, in 2009, Congress provided (1) over $43 billion in direct spending to support 
agriculture through numerous Department of Agriculture programs (excluding food stamps) 
and another $6.5 billion to support agriculture through a tax credit for alcohol fuels (in 
addition to other agriculture-related tax preferences); (2) over $66 billion in direct spending 
to provide poverty relief through the food-stamp program and another $52.8 billion to 
provide poverty relief through the earned-income tax credit; and (3) over $32 billion in 
direct spending to support education through numerous Department of Education programs 
and another $22.4 billion to support education through numerous tax-expenditure programs.  
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 48-
49, 67-68 (2011); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 29, 38-40, 43 (Comm. Print 2010).  The GAO reports that 
redundant direct spending and tax expenditures to subsidize ethanol will cost the federal 
government $5.7 billion in 2011 and that there are nine direct-spending programs and seven 
tax-expenditure programs to subsidize post-secondary education.  GAO REPORT, supra note 
1, at 59-60, 75. 
13 As used in this Article, the terms “administrative redundancy” and “redundancy” refer 
to redundancy in administrative programs effected by legislative action; they exclude 
redundancy in administrative programs effected by independent action within the executive 
branch.  For examples of the latter, see Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and 
Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 104-08 (1992). 
14 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 192-93 (1962). 
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instruments.15  Underpinning their debate is the implicit assumption that, in 
pursuing any particular policy objective, Congress should choose either direct 
spending or a tax expenditure – but not both.  Thoughtful participants in the 
debate note the high cost of coordinating redundant programs, and they point 
out that poorly coordinated programs not only waste fiscal resources but also 
undermine legislative objectives.16 
Others, however, have constructed a qualified defense of redundancy.  
Drawing on work in political science and public administration, certain legal 
scholars argue that redundancy can improve the reliability of administrative 
programs, thereby providing an important failsafe when policy stakes are 
high.17  As engineers have long recognized, the use of redundant components 
having independent risks of failure exponentially increases the prospects of 
system success; thus, commercial aircraft that can fly with a single engine 
typically have two, three, or even four engines.18  Similarly, the argument in 
the legal literature runs, Congress rationally might establish multiple 
administrative programs aimed at a single policy objective – such as food 
stamps and the earned income tax credit, both of which deliver poverty relief.  
Because the success or failure of the food-stamps program should be 
independent of the success or failure of the earned income tax credit, Congress 
can increase the reliability of its overall anti-poverty efforts by maintaining 
both programs. 
This Article takes a different approach.  Rather than address the normative 
point in isolation, this Article considers the etiological question – examining 
the source of redundancy – before turning to the normative question.  The 
inquiry focuses on Congress as an institution and aims to identify the specific 
organizational structures within Congress that account for administrative 
redundancy.  This Article makes two key assumptions: first, that Congress 
ordinarily does not deliberate about the merits of redundancy or choose 
redundancy for its own sake;19 second, that the internal structures of Congress 
 
15 These scholars generally have followed the lead of Stanley Surrey, who fixed the 
parallelism of direct spending and tax expenditures firmly within the tax catechism.  See, 
e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970). 
16 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 409 (1997).   
17 See, Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197, 
1222-30 (2006); David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and 
Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1839-43 (2006). 
18 Staudt, supra note 17, at 1222-23.  For the military’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, 
Congress even authorized the production of redundant engines by different manufacturers.  
Christopher Drew, House Votes to End Alternate Jet Engine Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2011, at B1.  The House of Representatives recently voted to end funding for one of the two 
engines, largely because of concerns about distributive costs.  Id.; see infra Part II.A 
(discussing distributive costs of administrative redundancy). 
19 This assumption is not intended to be categorical.  Certainly there are cases in which 
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affect legislative outcomes.20  As shown here, the institutional analysis reveals 
that redundancy is the product of a stubborn preference in both the Senate and 
the House of Representatives to legislate through standing committees that 
have overlapping jurisdictions and that benefit from extensive parliamentary 
prerogatives.  The congressional committee system, by accident rather than by 
design, accounts for administrative redundancy.   
The first contribution of this Article, then, is to set out a legislative-
organization account of redundancy.  Every congressional committee has 
strong incentives to protect and expand its jurisdiction, both through new 
legislation and through oversight of executive-branch agencies.  The 
establishment and maintenance of administrative programs, even if duplicative 
of other programs, enable a committee to exercise its existing jurisdiction and 
to stake new jurisdictional claims.  From the perspective of committee 
members, that outcome is unquestionably good.  In Congress, as in the 
bureaucracy, turf is everything.21  No less importantly, standing committees 
enjoy substantial parliamentary prerogatives in both chambers of Congress.  
These prerogatives – such as the power to block floor amendments and the 
power to dominate the bicameral conference committees – effectively prevent 
chamber majorities from moving legislation unacceptably far from the policy 
positions preferred by the standing committees.  The legislative-organization 
account set forth here contrasts with prior attempts to connect redundancy with 
the congressional committee system.22  As argued below, those attempts rely 
on incomplete and inadequate descriptions of the legislative process.23 
The Article’s second contribution is to re-examine the normative arguments 
for and against redundancy in light of the legislative-organization account.  
Contemporary political theory provides two principal explanations of the 
congressional committee system – one grounded in distributive theory and one 
grounded in informational theory.  Although neither has examined the question 
of administrative redundancy, both the distributive account and the 
informational account posit credible rationales for the committee system that, 
in turn, inform the evaluation of redundancy.  More specifically, the 
distributive account supports the dominant criticism of redundancy as wasteful 
and undesirable; indeed, the distributive account adds a particularly invidious 
interest-group dimension to that criticism.  Informational theory, however, 
implies that the institutional determinants of redundancy usefully facilitate 
specialization by legislators and improve the quality of instrumental 
 
Congress chooses to establish redundant administrative programs.   
20 This assumption is a standard point of contemporary political theory. 
21 KING, supra note 6, at 1, 143. 
22 See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 17, at 1204-08, 1214-22.  The connection between 
redundancy and the committee system actually was identified many years before Staudt’s 
article.  See Melvin Anshen, The Program Budget in Operation, in PROGRAM BUDGETING: 
PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 353, 359 (David Novick ed., 1965). 
23 See infra Part I.B. 
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knowledge available to Congress.  On this view, redundancy is a desirable by-
product of a system that improves the quality of legislative decisions.  The 
distributive costs and informational benefits are illustrated through a case study 
of the redundant federal programs for retirement security.24 
The Article’s third contribution is to outline and assess specific institutional 
reforms.  The conventional normative analysis of redundancy – which either 
condemns redundancy as wasteful or praises it for improving reliability – fails 
to consider the broader effects on the legislative process of the institutional 
changes necessary to produce less or more redundancy.  This Article, by 
contrast, draws from the legislative-organization account to identify specific 
institutional reforms that would improve the trade-off between the distributive 
downside and the informational upside of the congressional committee system.  
One approach would formally incorporate outside policy expertise into the 
legislative process, in the manner used to determine domestic military base 
closings and realignments.  A second approach would promote redundancy in 
program design but would curtail redundancy in program implementation by 
curbing the parliamentary prerogatives of congressional committees.   
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I sets out the legislative-organization 
theory of redundancy.  This Part demonstrates how the congressional 
committee system facilitates the establishment and maintenance of redundant 
programs, and it sharpens the contrast between this organizational theory and 
previous analyses of redundancy in the legal literature.  Part II discusses the 
distributive and informational accounts of the committee system provided by 
political theory, reconsiders the normative arguments about redundancy in 
light of the distributive and informational accounts, and illustrates those points 
with a case study.  Part III examines institutional reform in light of the analyses 
in Parts I and II. 
I. A LEGISLATIVE-ORGANIZATION THEORY OF REDUNDANCY 
This Part argues that administrative redundancy should be attributed to the 
congressional committee system.  Political scientists have studied 
congressional committees extensively, but they have largely ignored the 
connection between the committee system and redundant administrative 
programs.  Building on insights about legislative organization from the 
political science literature, Part I.A demonstrates that redundancy is a 
contingent but almost inevitable consequence of the institutional decision to 
organize Congress around committees that have overlapping jurisdictions and 
strong parliamentary prerogatives.  Part I.B contrasts this legislative-
organization account with prior treatments of administrative redundancy in the 
legal literature.  No claim is made here that the legislative-organization 
account set forth in Part I.A provides a complete explanation of administrative 
redundancy.  Legislative organizational structures are an important source of 
redundancy, but there no doubt are other sources.  
 
24 See infra Part II.C. 
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A. Redundancy as a Function of the Committee System 
The House and the Senate share an enduring commitment to the use of 
standing committees – “the lifeblood of the congressional system”25 and “the 
nerve ends of Congress”26 – as the principal vehicle for producing legislation.27  
Noting this, Woodrow Wilson famously remarked, “[I]t is not far from the 
truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst 
Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.”28  Still, the role of the 
standing committees has not been uniform across chambers or across time.  
Under the rules, norms, and practices that govern Congress, committees 
historically have been stronger in the House than in the Senate.29  Within the 
House, institutional reforms in the early 1970s transferred considerable 
authority from full committees to leadership, subcommittees, and the rank and 
file, thereby ending the “committee era.”30  More ephemeral reforms of the 
middle 1990s further consolidated the power of leadership at the expense of 
the standing committees.31  And each committee always remains subject to the 
important but rarely used power of the House or Senate floor to strip the 
committee of its jurisdiction or to disband the committee entirely.32 
But even at the lowest ebb of their influence, the committees exercise 
primary authority over legislation within their respective jurisdictions.33  The 
formal rules of the House and the Senate provide that each bill or resolution 
introduced in the chamber must be referred to the standing committee of 
jurisdiction;34 that committee then has the exclusive authority to report or not 
 
25 S. REP. NO. 103-215, vol. 2, at 7 (1993) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
26 H.R. REP. NO. 93-916, pt. II, at 9 (1974) [hereinafter FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE 
REPORT] (select committee chaired by Rep. Bolling).  For a working draft of the Final 
Bolling Committee Report, see H. SELECT COMM. ON COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE STRUCTURE 
AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: WORKING DRAFT OF REPORT OF THE 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMITTEES (1973) [hereinafter DRAFT BOLLING COMMITTEE 
REPORT].   
27 See CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 225-28 
(3d ed. 1997).  Except where specifically indicated otherwise, any reference in this Article 
to legislative committees includes, mutatis mutandis, reference to subcommittees. 
28 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 79 (1885). 
29 RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 147 (1973).   
30 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 33-39. 
31 Id. at 47-52. 
32 Id. at 10. 
33 Id. at 6-10; see Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1, H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, 
at 426-537 (2009) (defining organization and jurisdiction of House standing committees); 
Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXV.1, S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 25-37 (2008) (defining 
organization and jurisdiction of Senate standing committees). 
34 Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1, R. X.11, R. XII.2, H.R. Doc. No. 110-
162, at 426, 524-25, 603-09; Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XVII.1-XVII.3, R. XXV.1, S. 
Doc. No. 110-1, at 16-17, 25-37.   
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to report the measure for consideration on the floor.35  There are, of course, 
exceptions to this basic process: House or Senate leaders sometimes bring a 
measure directly to the floor without committee consideration;36 leaders 
occasionally change the substantive content of a measure after it has been 
reported out of committee;37 and, in the House, the Rules Committee may 
extract a measure from another committee, or a floor majority may discharge a 
measure from committee by petition.38  Use of those end-run procedures, 
however, remains exceptional.   
Normal legislative process therefore makes each committee effectively 
sovereign over matters within its jurisdiction.  No tax legislation can move 
through the House, for example, without the approval of the Ways and Means 
Committee.  Even if a measure directly implicates the jurisdiction of another 
committee, the Ways and Means Committee can veto the measure by refusing 
to report it to the House.  Thus, the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 200939 (commonly known as the “cap-and-trade” bill) was written primarily 
by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which by rule has 
jurisdiction over the “[e]xploration, production, storage, supply, marketing, 
pricing, and regulation of energy resources” and, to boot, “[n]ational energy 
policy generally.”40  But, as originally written, the cap-and-trade measure 
included tax preferences intended to offset higher energy costs, and those tax 
preferences fell within the Ways and Means Committee’s broad jurisdiction 
over “[r]evenue measures generally.”41  The Energy and Commerce 
Committee could not bring the cap-and-trade measure to the House floor on its 
own; the Ways and Means Committee had the authority to approve or reject 
the tax provisions before the full House could even begin to consider it.   
1. Jurisdictional Fragmentation in the Committee System 
Committee jurisdiction, then, is central to the legislative process.  Congress 
produces legislation through its committees, and the committees normally have 
exclusive authority over the policy matters in their jurisdiction.  But 
jurisdiction over specific policy matters is strikingly fragmented.42  As a 
 
35 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 6-10. 
36 BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE 
U.S. CONGRESS 17-20 (2007). 
37 Id. at 20-23. 
38 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 7-8. 
39 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
40 Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1(f), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 438-39 
(2009). 
41 Id. R. X.1(t), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 473. 
42 KING, supra note 6, at 6.  As used in this Article (following King), the term 
“fragmentation” refers to the breaking up of jurisdiction over a single policy matter across 
multiple committees.  Deering and Smith use the term “fragmentation” differently – to 
“describe[] the degree to which a committee attracts the attention of outsiders who perceive 
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formal matter, the rules of the House and the Senate respectively define the 
jurisdictions of the twenty-one standing committees in the House and the 
eighteen standing committees in the Senate that have legislative authority, but 
those formal jurisdictions overlap considerably.43  In the House, for example, 
the Ways and Means Committee has jurisdiction over customs, ports of entry 
and delivery, trade agreements, government bonds, deposits of public monies, 
and transportation of dutiable goods (in addition to its broad jurisdiction over 
revenue).44  That jurisdiction overlaps with the jurisdiction of several other 
House committees – such as the Energy and Commerce Committee’s 
jurisdiction over “[i]nterstate and foreign commerce generally,”45 the Financial 
Services Committee’s jurisdiction over “[i]nternational finance” and “[m]oney 
and credit,”46 the Foreign Affairs Committee’s jurisdiction over 
“[i]nternational commodity agreements” and “[m]easures to foster commercial 
intercourse with foreign nations,”47 and the Homeland Security Committee’s 
jurisdiction over “[b]order and port security.”48 
Similarly, the broad grant by rule of energy jurisdiction to the Energy and 
Commerce Committee sits awkwardly alongside grants of jurisdiction over 
“[r]ural electrification” to the Agriculture Committee,49 “[c]onservation, 
development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves” to the Armed 
Services Committee,50 “[p]etroleum conservation on public lands” to the 
 
their interests as unrelated to each other.”  DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 88.  To 
illustrate the difference: One would say that jurisdiction over health care is fragmented in 
the House, as that term is used by King and by this Article, because several committees – 
including the Education and the Workforce, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means 
Committees – all claim jurisdiction over it; Deering and Smith would say that the 
jurisdiction of the Education and the Workforce Committee is fragmented because it 
includes authority over both schools and labor unions. 
43
 Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1, R. X.11, H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 
426-75, 524-25; Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXV.1, S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 25-37 
(2008).  Two of the Senate committees with legislative authority – the Indian Affairs 
Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence – are not listed in the Senate Rules.  
See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 17.  Also, as Deering and Smith note, the 
intelligence committees in both the House and the Senate should be regarded as standing 
committees, even though they are formally designated as “select” committees.  Id.  Several 
other committees in Congress, such as the Joint Committee on Taxation, do not have 
legislative authority and are disregarded here. 
44
 Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1(t), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 473.  
This list is not exclusive.  House Rule X.1(t) also confers jurisdiction on the Ways and 
Means Committee over other policy matters. 
45 Id. R. X.1(f), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 438. 
46 Id. R. X.1(h), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 442. 
47 Id. R. X.1(i), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 445. 
48 Id. R. X.1(j), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 447. 
49 Id. R. X.1(a), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 429. 
50 Id. R. X.1(c), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 432. 
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Natural Resources Committee,51 “[a]ll energy research, development, and 
demonstration, and projects therefor, and all federally owned or operated 
nonmilitary energy laboratories” to the Science, Space, and Technology 
Committee,52 and “[w]ater power” to the Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee.53  The formal rules of the Senate provide for irregular 
jurisdictional boundaries as well.54  As political scientist David King stated, “It 
is impossible, as students of parliamentary procedure have long noted, to have 
jurisdictions without ambiguities.”55  Those ambiguities generate jurisdictional 
overlap and fragmentation. 
The problem only becomes more pronounced as the full scope of committee 
jurisdictions is considered.  King has argued persuasively that significant 
segments of each committee’s jurisdiction are recognized not by the formal 
rules of the House and the Senate but by the binding precedents established 
through referral of particular bills and resolutions.56  As King has shown, the 
precedents set through the referral process account for most changes in 
jurisdictional boundaries: committees use the referral process to expand their 
jurisdictions interstitially and incrementally, particularly in the case of 
emerging policy areas57 – such as retirement-security policy during the 1960s, 
energy policy during the 1970s, communications policy during the 1990s, and 
domestic counter-terrorism policy during the 2000s. 
 
51 Id. R. X.1(m), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 455. 
52 Id. R. X.1(o), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 463 (as amended by H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. 
§ 9(A) (2011)). 
53 Id. R. X.1(r), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 470. 
54 For example, the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee has jurisdiction 
over “[e]xport and foreign trade promotion,” Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XXV.1(d)(1), 
S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 27 (2008), but the Finance Committee has jurisdiction over 
“[r]eciprocal trade agreements,” id. R. XXV.1(i), S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 30; the Judiciary 
Committee has jurisdiction over “[n]ational penitentiaries,” id. R. XXV.1(l), S. Doc. No. 
110-1, at 33, but the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee has jurisdiction 
over “[c]onvict labor and the entry of goods made by convicts into interstate commerce,” id. 
R. XXV.1(m)(1), S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 34; and the Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee has jurisdiction over “[m]ining,” id. R. XXV.1(g)(1), S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 29, 
but the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee has jurisdiction over 
“[o]ccupational safety and health, including the welfare of miners,” id. R. XXV.1(m)(1), S. 
Doc. No. 110-1, at 34. 
55 KING, supra note 6, at 18. 
56 Id. at 6-7, 37-40; see also JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 25, at 19 
(“[C]ommittee jurisdictions are not static; they continually evolve through precedent, 
agreements between committees, and changes in the scope of government policy.”); David 
C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48, 
49 (1994). 
57 KING, supra note 6, at 15, 19, 37-40; see also Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner 
& Jeffrey C. Talbert, The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 657, 660 (1993). 
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By drafting a measure that lies just beyond its established jurisdiction and 
persuading the chamber parliamentarian to refer the measure to it, a committee 
can increase its domain, not just for that measure but for all subsequent 
measures on the same matter.58  This measure-by-measure expansion of 
committee jurisdiction normally does not result in one committee wresting 
established jurisdiction from another committee.  Rather, the committees use 
the referral process to claim jurisdiction over issues that fall in the uncertain 
regions of jurisdictional overlap, effectively creating concurrent jurisdiction 
within broad policy areas.59  There need be no appreciable space between the 
Energy and Commerce Committee’s jurisdiction over “energy policy”60 and 
the Science, Space, and Technology Committee’s jurisdiction over “energy 
research [and] development.”61  Both committees can exercise jurisdiction, one 
measure at a time, over issues within the jurisdictional intersection.  
In short, both the formal rules and the referral precedents lead to pronounced 
jurisdictional overlap and fragmentation.  Broad policy areas – such as 
agriculture, national security, international trade, and poverty relief – are not 
allocated uniquely to specific legislative committees; instead, multiple 
committees legitimately claim authority to common domains.62  In effect, 
“[t]he complexity and interconnectedness of many contemporary issues almost 
guarantee that more than one committee will share jurisdiction over 
legislation.”63  Thus, King observed that more than one hundred different 
House and Senate committees and subcommittees claimed jurisdiction over 
defense and veterans matters and that ninety different committees and 
subcommittees claimed jurisdiction over the Environmental Protection 
Agency.64  Additionally, he identified thirteen different House committees 
 
58 KING, supra note 6, at 8-9, 22-23, 29, 40-41, 105-09; see also WALTER J. OLESZEK, 
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 84 (7th ed. 2007). 
59 KING, supra note 6, at 37-41; King, supra note 56, at 50. 
60 Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1(f)(11), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 439 
(2009). 
61 Id. R. X.1(p)(1), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 463 (as amended by H.R. Res. 5, 112th 
Cong. § 9(A) (2011)). 
62 See, e.g., FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 26 (“Too often policy 
consideration is fragmented and split; a comprehensive view of issues is needed, a rational 
system for determining what is going on.  House committees should be organized to give 
coherent consideration to a number of pressing policy problems whose handling has been 
fragmented, e.g. energy resource utilization, research and development, health care, 
transportation, environmental protection, and foreign affairs.”). 
63 OLESZEK, supra note 58, at 79; see also FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 26, at 18-19 (“In the 28 years since the House was last reorganized, the shape of 
national problems has changed so dramatically that jurisdictional lines are tangled, 
workloads unbalanced, and overlap and confusion all too frequent.”); id. at 55 (“Modern 
legislation inevitably crosses jurisdictional lines.”). 
64 KING, supra note 6, at 70-71.  Those observations were based on the jurisdictional 
configurations in 1994. 
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claiming jurisdiction over the “more than 125 federal programs aimed at 
helping children and their families.”65  Similarly, a joint committee on the 
organization of Congress remarked in 1993 that “drug policy” did not fall 
solely within the jurisdiction of any one committee: “[M]any committees 
handle aspects of the issue, including Education and Labor for drug use in 
schools, Energy and Commerce for health effects of drugs, Foreign Affairs for 
international drug interdiction, and Judiciary for criminal penalties for drug 
users.”66 
The claim here is not that the institutional commitment to the committee 
system makes extensive jurisdictional fragmentation and overlap inevitable.67  
One can readily conceive of a committee system in which Congress would 
allocate jurisdiction over established policy areas among different committees 
and would assign jurisdiction over emerging policy areas to a single committee 
in each chamber.68  But the imperfectly defined and inherently unstable 
committee jurisdictions actually used in the House and the Senate have 
entrenched jurisdictional fragmentation.  Even several rounds of reform since 
the end of the Second World War have simply written these irregular 
jurisdictional boundaries into the rules of the House and the Senate.69  And 
there should be little doubt as to why.  Legislators of course want to participate 
in legislative activity, and the number of committees on which they can serve 
is limited.70  By maintaining a large number of committees with legislative 
authority, legislators increase their opportunities for desirable committee 
assignments; by pushing the jurisdictions of their committees outward, they 
increase the prospects that those assignments will yield desirable legislative 
work.71  But, in so doing, legislators also fragment control over specific policy 
areas. 
 
65 Id. at 140-41.  That observation was based on the jurisdictional configurations in 1997. 
66 JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 25, at 20-21. 
67 But see FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 4 (“[O]verlap in 
jurisdiction is likely to continue regardless of committee realinements [sic] . . . .”); DRAFT 
BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 57 (“Considering the interdependencies of 
governmental activities, . . . overlapping committee responsibilities will continue to be a fact 
of life that is not only unavoidable, but in some cases desirable.”). 
68 See, e.g., FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 20 (recommending 
that the House “implement a procedure to assure continuous review of jurisdictional 
assignments and encourage cooperation among committees dealing with related matters”). 
69 Id. at 12; KING, supra note 6, at 56-77.  For reviews of efforts to reform committee 
jurisdictions since the end of the Second World War, see generally JOINT COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 25, at 9-15, and E. SCOTT ADLER, WHY CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS FAIL: 
REELECTION AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 108-212 (2002).  For an analysis of the 
failure to reform intelligence-oversight jurisdiction after September 11, 2001, see 
O’Connell, supra note 10, at 1671-73. 
70 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 96-108. 
71 Legislators recognize that desirable committee work is a critical objective.  See, e.g., 
FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 19 (recommending that “[c]ommittee 
  
1828 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1815 
 
2. Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Committee Preferences 
Since Richard Fenno published his study of congressional committees in the 
early 1970s, it has become commonplace to attribute three basic objectives to 
legislators: securing reelection, pursuing institutional prestige, and enacting 
good policy.72  In most cases, the goals of reelection and institutional prestige 
lead committees to build up and act on their jurisdiction as much as possible; 
in many (if not most) cases, the goal of good policy does so as well.73  The 
exercise of committee jurisdiction, in turn, regularly manifests itself in 
legislation that projects committee authority into the executive branch through 
the establishment, maintenance, or reform of administrative programs.  For 
example, a House member serving on the Education and the Workforce 
Committee may want to authorize a new college-scholarship program because 
she believes it will deliver benefits to her constituents and improve her 
reelection prospects; a member serving on the Ways and Means Committee 
may want to establish a new retirement-savings program because he believes 
that the resources needed for oversight of the program will increase the 
institutional prestige and influence of his committee; and a member serving on 
the Natural Resources Committee may want to establish a new agency to 
regulate oil and gas drilling because she believes that such regulation will 
protect coastal wetlands.  King cites a prominent example: “In 1977 [the 
House] Commerce [Committee] reported a bill creating the Department of 
Energy, the future oversight of which firmly established the Commerce 
Committee as a major player in all energy legislation.”74 
Because committee jurisdictions overlap, the administrative programs that 
the committees create overlap as well.  The Education and the Workforce 
Committee has the authority to establish a college-scholarship program under 
the Department of Education;75 but the Ways and Means Committee can 
establish a college-expense tax deduction or tax credit administered by the 
Treasury Department,76 the Agriculture Committee can maintain agricultural-
 
jurisdictions . . . be equalized to afford each Member of the House an opportunity to 
participate meaningfully in decisions affecting the lives of their constituents”); DRAFT 
BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 1 (“Committee assignments should provide 
each Member with an opportunity for meaningful participation in making decisions within a 
significant public policy field.”). 
72 FENNO, supra note 29, at 1; see also DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 61-62; KING, 
supra note 6, at 2, 25; John W. Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563, 569-
70,  574-79 (1977). 
73 KING, supra note 6, at 20-21.  As Fenno put it, “For member satisfaction, a necessary 
condition would seem to be committee activity.”  FENNO, supra note 29, at 277. 
74 KING, supra note 6, at 70. 
75 See Rules of the House of Representatives, R. X.1(e)(6), H.R. Doc. 110-162, at 436 
(2009) (giving the committee jurisdiction over “[e]ducation or labor generally”). 
76 See id. R. X.1(t)(3), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 473 (giving the committee jurisdiction 
over “[r]evenue measures generally”). 
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college scholarships administered by the Agriculture Department,77 and the 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee can authorize science and 
engineering scholarships through the National Science Foundation.78  
Similarly, the Natural Resources Committee can set up a new federal agency 
within the Department of the Interior to oversee coastal-water drilling;79 but 
the Energy and Commerce Committee can set up a parallel agency having a 
parallel function within the Department of Energy,80 and the Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee can do the same within the Department of 
Transportation.81  Member goals push committees to enact administrative 
programs, but nothing about those goals pushes committees to coordinate 
programs with those established by other committees.82 
3. Committee Preferences, Parliamentary Prerogatives, and Redundancy 
Both the House and the Senate confer strong parliamentary prerogatives on 
their standing committees that generally enable the committees to protect their 
preferred policy positions in measures that the committees report to the full 
chamber.  These prerogatives, which extend well beyond the basic positive and 
negative agenda control attributable to committee proposal and gate-keeping 
power,83 enable the committees to resist changes that would eliminate or scale 
 
77 See id. R. X.1(a)(4), (6), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 428 (giving the committee 
jurisdiction over “[a]gricultural colleges” and “[a]gricultural education extension services”). 
78 See id. R. X.1(p)(10), (13), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 464 (giving the committee 
jurisdiction over the National Science Foundation and “[s]cience scholarships”). 
79 See id. R. X.1(m)(15), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 469 (giving the committee 
jurisdiction over “[m]arine affairs”). 
80 See id. R. X.1(f)(6), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 438 (giving the committee jurisdiction 
over “[e]xploration, production, storage, supply marketing, pricing, and regulation of energy 
resources, including all fossil fuels”). 
81 See id. R. X.1(r)(15), H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 455 (giving the committee 
jurisdiction over “marine affairs, including coastal zone management, as they relate to oil 
and other pollution of navigable waters”). 
82
 Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert found that committees with overlapping jurisdictions 
tend not to pursue inter-committee coordination when developing legislation.  Jones, 
Baumgartner & Talbert, supra note 57, at 664; see also FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 58 (“All too often . . . there is little or no communication, either among 
Members or committee staffs, on questions of mutual concern.  Where there should be 
cooperation, there is more likely to be found competition and a failure to communicate.”).  
At least in theory, the practice of multiple referrals in the House (under which a single 
measure may be referred to more than one committee) could mitigate redundancy to the 
extent that committees considering a single measure coordinate their activities.  The norm 
under multiple referrals, however, is that “committees are strictly limited to working only on 
issues within their established domain.”  KING, supra note 6, at 101.   
83 See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of 
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987) (emphasizing ex post veto power and 
standing committees’ dominance of conference committees). 
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back proposed administrative programs.  Consider first the floor stage.  Neither 
the House nor the Senate has a formal process for reviewing legislation 
between a committee and the floor,84 but non-committee members could 
propose floor amendments to coordinate new programs in pending legislation 
with programs already in existence, thereby mitigating redundancy.  However, 
committee proposals for redundant administrative programs face limited 
prospects of meaningful revision on either the House or the Senate floor.  As 
political scientists have long recognized, committees in both chambers enjoy a 
norm of deference from non-committee members.85  Legislators may be 
reluctant to breach the norm, particularly if they believe that committee 
members have superior expertise over the subject matter of the legislation.  
Additionally, legislators recognize that the norm is sustained in large part by 
reciprocity: If one member attacks a program authorized by a second member’s 
bill, the first member exposes herself to a similar attack from the second 
member. 
Even apart from the deference norm, the House is particularly inhospitable 
to floor amendments.  During the committee era, powerful committee chairs 
discouraged members from offering floor amendments, and overall floor-
amendment activity was modest.86  The number of floor amendments increased 
sharply after the legislative reforms of the early 1970s and the introduction of 
electronic voting,87 but House leadership, at the urging of rank-and-file 
members, soon began to curb floor amendments through ad hoc resolutions – 
known as “special rules” – that designate the amendments members can offer 
to a particular measure or that block members from offering any amendments 
 
84 One qualification should be noted: The Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 does provide for a measure of inter-committee coordination, under the 
authority of the House and Senate Budget Committees, through annual budget resolutions 
and the reconciliation process.  See 2 U.S.C. §§ 602, 641 (2006); DEERING & SMITH, supra 
note 27, at 193-202.  For an analysis of how that process affects aggregate spending, see 
Dhammika Dharmapala, The Congressional Budget Process, Aggregate Spending, and 
Statutory Budget Rules, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 119 (2006). 
85 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 83, at 87, 100; see also DEERING & SMITH, supra note 
27, at 203.  Shepsle and Weingast explain floor deference to committees through three 
enforcement mechanisms: punishment, “ex ante defensive behavior” (for example, 
accommodating reported measures to the floor median), and “ex post defensive behavior” 
(that is, the ex post veto exercised in conference).  Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 83, at 
88-89.  But see Steven S. Smith, An Essay on Sequence, Position, Goals and Committee 
Power, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 151, 173-75 (1988) (arguing that Shepsle and Weingast overstate 
the effect of ex post veto in protecting committee preferences on the floor). 
86 STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 20-24 
(1989). 
87 STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES 27-33 (1988); SMITH, 
supra note 86, at 24-36. 
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to the measure at all.88  In the contemporary House, few measures are brought 
to the floor under open rules, which allow any member to offer any germane 
amendment.  Instead, most controversial measures are offered under closed 
rules, which prohibit all amendments, or special rules that so greatly restrict 
amendments as to be effectively closed.89  Non-controversial measures usually 
are brought up under unanimous-consent or suspension-of-the-rules 
procedures, which never allow amendments.90  Even for measures brought to 
the floor under open rules, a committee can defend its preferences against 
hostile amendments through counter-amendments (backed by House rules 
limiting amendment depth and controlling floor recognition), thereby 
increasing the likelihood that the measures ultimately will reflect the 
committee’s ideal outcome.91 
The Senate has no formal process for limiting or blocking floor 
amendments, but it can reach a similar result through unanimous-consent 
agreements.92  These agreements, which are negotiated by the majority and 
minority leaders and which (as the name implies) cannot be implemented over 
the objection of any senator, structure the floor debate and amendment process 
on a measure-by-measure or even day-by-day basis.93  Although not as strong 
as the closed rules of the House, unanimous-consent agreements screen out 
numerous floor amendments that senators would otherwise offer.  To the 
extent that senators’ preferences to structure and limit floor consideration of a 
measure are stronger than their preferences to prevent the measure from 
establishing or maintaining redundant administrative programs, the 
unanimous-consent procedure in the Senate – like the closed rule in the House 
– facilitates the realization of committee preferences and, with those 
preferences, administrative redundancy. 
No less important than the prerogatives on the floor, committees also enjoy 
de facto veto power after legislation has been passed by their chambers.94  
Members of a committee reporting a measure to the full chamber have 
disproportionate representation on the conference committee that reconciles 
differences between the House and Senate versions of the measure.  
Leadership in each chamber often appoints as conferees the chair and ranking 
member of the reporting committee and other members whom the chair and 
 
88 BACH & SMITH, supra note 87, at 50-74. 
89 Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1387-90 (2010). 
90 Id. at 1372-73. 
91 Barry R. Weingast, Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the 
Open Rule, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 796 (1989); see also Barry R. Weingast, Fighting 
Fire with Fire: Amending Activity and Institutional Change in the Postreform Congress, in 
THE POSTREFORM CONGRESS 142, 161 (Roger H. Davidson ed., 1992). 
92 OLESZEK, supra note 58, at 203-12. 
93 Id. at 203-04, 208-09.  
94 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 215. 
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ranking member designate.95  Stacking the conference committee in this way 
provides the committee that originates legislation with an opportunity to 
remove any floor changes made over its objection; the conference committee’s 
report cannot then be amended in either the House or the Senate to reinstate 
those changes.96 
Thus, the standing committees in the House and the Senate normally 
exercise final say, subject to floor ratification in a straight up-or-down vote, 
over the administrative programs that Congress enacts, whether or not those 
programs are redundant.  Certainly the anticipation of this “ex post adjustment 
power” influences floor amendment activity when measures are first 
considered in the two chambers.  In both the House and the Senate, legislators 
generally prefer to offer amendments acceptable to the committee reporting the 
underlying measure because the legislators know that, in the event a floor 
amendment passes over the objections of the reporting committee, the 
committee members serving in conference may strip the amendment out or 
may refuse to approve the underlying measure.97  The veto power that standing 
committees exercise over conference outcomes constitutes “the enforcement 
mechanism that allows [floor] reciprocity and deference to work smoothly.”98 
Taken together, the committees’ parliamentary prerogatives skew legislative 
outcomes toward committee policy preferences.  Those preferences often 
involve the establishment and maintenance of administrative programs, and 
jurisdictional overlap among the committees all but ensures redundancy among 
those programs.  Moreover, the parliamentary prerogatives facilitate 
administrative redundancy even in cases not involving jurisdictional overlap.  
For example, members of the House and Senate education committees – acting 
on the usual motivations involving reelection, prestige, and policy – may want 
to provide new subsidies for post-secondary education that are redundant with 
other subsidy programs that fall within their own jurisdiction.  The 
parliamentary prerogatives make it difficult for other legislators to block the 
new subsidies or even to coordinate the new subsidies with existing subsidies 
over the committees’ objections.  In short, the congressional committee system 
facilitates redundancy both by reason of multiple committees exercising 
overlapping jurisdictions and by reason of a single committee exercising its 
own jurisdiction. 
These features of the committee system are general; consistent with that, 
redundancy is observed in a wide array of policy settings.99  But two additional 
 
95 Id. at 215-18; Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 83, at 97-100. 
96 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 218. 
97 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 83, at 86, 89-90, 93-97. 
98 Id. at 90.  For debate over the argument that the conference-based ex post veto grounds 
the institutional power of the standing committees, see Smith, supra note 85, and Keith 
Krehbiel, Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Why Are Congressional Committees 
Powerful?, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 929 (1987).   
99 See GAO REPORT, supra note 1; Staudt, supra note 17, at 1203; Weisbach, supra note 
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factors contribute to a particularly strong tendency toward redundancy in the 
formation of fiscal policy.  First, as tax scholars have long noted, virtually any 
direct-spending program can be replicated through a tax-expenditure program.  
Broadly conceived, the legislature can fund federal programs through transfers 
(whether in-cash or in-kind) or through tax preferences.100  Thus, subsidies for 
post-secondary education can be delivered through tax deductions,101 tax 
credits,102 and non-taxable savings accounts;103 wage subsidies for the working 
poor can be delivered through refundable tax credits;104 and subsidies for 
manufacturers,105 farmers,106 producers of “alternative energy,”107 and other 
industrial and commercial activities can be provided through tax exclusions, 
deductions, credits, or preferential timing rules.   
Second, the traditional stature, power, and ambition of the congressional 
tax-writing committees make the possibility of such duplication particularly 
likely.  The Ways and Means Committee, one of four prestige committees in 
the House,108 has a reputation for asserting broad jurisdictional claims,109 and 
House rules and practices have long privileged the Ways and Means 
Committee when its claims conflict with those of another committee.110  The 
Finance Committee is perhaps less prominent within the Senate than the Ways 
and Means Committee is within the House.  But the Finance Committee’s 
traditional focus on gratifying constituents underscores its institutional bias in 
favor of the enactment and preservation of tax expenditures, including tax 
expenditures that duplicate existing direct-spending programs.111  And both 
committees engage in high levels of legislative activity.  Congress has 
amended the tax code every year during the last half century, and there has 
been a substantial item of tax legislation in more years than not since President 
 
17, at 1828-29; David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 Yale L. J. 955, 963 n.15 (2004).   
100
 Surrey, supra note 15, at 706; see also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, 
TAX EXPENDITURES 99 (1985). 
101 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 221-22 (2006) (tax deductions for interest on certain student 
loans and for certain education expenses). 
102 See, e.g., id. § 25A (Hope Scholarship Credit, American opportunity tax credit, and 
Lifetime Learning Credit). 
103 See, e.g., id. §§ 529-30 (tax exemptions for qualified tuition programs and for 
Coverdell education savings accounts). 
104 See, e.g., id. § 32 (earned income tax credit). 
105 See, e.g., id. § 199 (tax deduction for domestic production activities). 
106 See, e.g., id. § 263A(d) (special tax cost-recovery rule for farmers). 
107 See, e.g., id. § 45K (tax credit for production of fuel from a “nonconventional 
source”). 
108 See, e.g., DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 64 tbl.3-1. 
109 OLESZEK, supra note 58, at 83 (describing the Ways and Means Committee as a 
jurisdictional “octopus”). 
110 KING, supra note 6, at 98.  
111 FENNO, supra note 29, at 156-57, 182-83. 
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Reagan took office.112  The tax-writing committees thus have frequent 
opportunities to promote tax expenditures that overlap with direct spending.113 
B. Prior Accounts of Redundancy 
The only prior argument in the legal literature identifying the congressional 
committee systems as a source of redundancy provides an incomplete account.  
Nancy Staudt attributed redundancy to the fragmentation of committee 
jurisdictions and predicted that, because of committee protectiveness of 
existing jurisdictions, efforts to mitigate redundancy would not be politically 
feasible.114  In this, she echoed Melvin Anshen, who argued more than four 
decades ago that the “interested counterpart[s] in the House and Senate 
Committee structure” likely would frustrate efforts to eliminate “wasteful 
duplications, overlaps, and inconsistencies” among agencies of the executive 
branch.115  But Staudt focused almost exclusively on committee gate-keeping 
 
112 See, e.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; Subchapter 
S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669; Social Security Amendments of 
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 
Stat. 494; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330; Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342; Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388; Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312; Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755; Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
34, 111 Stat. 788; Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38; Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752; American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 
Stat. 1418; Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780; American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115; Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029; Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
312, 124 Stat. 3296. 
113 Ordinarily, one would worry that the type of argument set out in Part I.A risks what 
Edna Ullmann-Margalit (following Karl Popper) called the “conspiracy fallacy.”  EDNA 
ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 181-82 (1977).  Congressional 
institutional arrangements, however, are endogenous to Congress: The majority can set and 
re-set those arrangements to suit its preferences.  It seems relatively safe, then, to attribute 
the favorable outcomes that legislators secure through legislative organization to the 
deliberate efforts of the legislators themselves. 
114 Staudt, supra note 17, at 1204-08, 1214-22; see also O’Connell, supra note 10, at 
1711. 
115 See Anshen, supra note 22, at 359.   
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and proposal power at the pre-floor stage and all but ignored the outsized 
committee influence and control at the floor and post-floor stages.116  Thus, 
Staudt demonstrated why committees propose redundant programs, but she 
failed to show why Congress enacts those proposals.   
An explanation of committee power that does not account for the floor and 
post-floor stages of the legislative process is inadequate.  On Staudt’s model, 
committees might report measures proposing redundant administrative 
programs, but those committees would be powerless to push their policy 
preferences through to actual legislative outcomes.  After all, “if gatekeeping 
and proposal power fully characterized committee power, . . . committees 
would not be terribly powerful”117 because the floor simply would roll the 
committees.  Additionally, Staudt’s model cannot account for administrative 
redundancy unrelated to jurisdictional fragmentation and overlap – such as the 
redundancy that occurs when the education committees in Congress authorize 
subsidies for post-secondary education that are duplicative of subsidies already 
authorized by those committees.  By contrast, the legislative-organization 
account set out in Part I.A builds on a comprehensive view of the legislative 
process – one that incorporates the influence and control that congressional 
committees exercise beyond the pre-floor stage.  The institutionalization of 
strong parliamentary prerogatives at the floor and post-floor stages, along with 
the more familiar gate-keeping and proposal powers, systematically biases 
legislative outcomes in favor of committee preferences.  Only by taking the 
full scope of those parliamentary prerogatives into account does it become 
clear how committee proposals for redundant programs are realized in law. 
Other academic accounts of administrative redundancy have been purely 
normative.  The dominant position among them, articulated most forcefully by 
Milton Friedman, condemns redundant administrative programs as patently 
wasteful.  In his landmark book on economic and political freedom, Friedman 
observed that the amounts spent by the government “on direct welfare 
payments and programs of all kinds [–] old age assistance, social security 
benefit payments, aid to dependent children, general assistance, farm price 
support programs, public housing, etc.” – would be adequate, if paid out as 
cash grants, to raise the income of the bottom ten percent of American 
households above the median income for all American households.118  Plainly, 
 
116 Staudt briefly considers the floor deference enjoyed by committees.  See Staudt, supra 
note 17, at 1237-38. 
117 Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 98, at 936 (Shepsle and Weingast’s 
response to Krehbiel).  For an argument that proposal power is sufficient to enable 
committees to secure disproportionate returns in distributive legislation, see David P. Baron 
& John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS 343, 
348 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989).  But even Baron and Ferejohn argue that proposal 
power, if not backed by certain parliamentary prerogatives favoring committees, “will not 
be an important source of committee power.”  Id. at 365. 
118 FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 193.  For a similar point, see Weisbach, supra note 17, at 
1856 (“The data we have to date indicate that if the total federal housing budget were 
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Friedman reasoned, the amounts paid out under the government’s redundant 
welfare programs were badly misspent, and he argued for replacing direct-
spending programs with a negative income tax under which low-income 
households would receive a single cash payment from the government.119 
In the same vein, Daniel Shaviro demonstrated that the income phase-outs 
of redundant assistance programs for low-income households often work at 
cross-purposes, producing irrational and counter-productive outcomes.120  Like 
Friedman, Shaviro argued for replacing such programs with demogrants and a 
negative income tax.121  The tax-expenditure literature has shared this rejection 
of redundancy.  In his familiar argument for the general superiority of direct 
spending, Stanley Surrey attacked tax expenditures for providing subsidies that 
increase as taxpayer income increases (so-called “upside-down” subsidies), for 
inappropriately narrowing the tax base, for increasing the complexity of federal 
tax law, and for locating non-tax policy questions beyond the jurisdiction of 
legislative committees and executive agencies having relevant expertise.122  In 
generally preferring direct-spending programs to tax-expenditure programs, 
Surrey implicitly rejected administrative redundancy, at least for fiscal 
policy.123 
 
maintained but all of the money currently in active production programs was shifted to 
vouchers, millions more people could be provided with housing.”). 
119 FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 191-93. 
120 See Shaviro, supra note 16, at 409-10, 424-27, 466, 469. 
121 Id. at 410, 469-73.  Other scholars have drawn similar conclusions about the 
redundancy of federal anti-poverty programs.  See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL 
SYSTEMS:  REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT 16-20 (1985); Robert H. Haveman, Introduction: 
Poverty and Social Policy in the 1960s and 1970s – An Overview and Some Speculations, in 
A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND LESSONS 
1, 14-16 (Robert H. Haveman ed., 1977). 
122 Surrey, supra note 15, at 720-26, 728-32; see also Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income 
Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct 
Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970).  Surrey also argued that neither the 
legislative branch nor the executive branch adequately took account of the budget effect of 
tax expenditures.  Surrey, supra note 15, at 729-32.  With the annual publication of the costs 
of tax expenditures and the formal incorporation of those costs into the federal budget, 
however, that concern has been overtaken by events (as the bureaucrats would say).  For a 
more recent re-examination of the problem of tax expenditures, see CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, 
THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 176-92 (1997). 
123 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 148-49 (1973).  Surrey’s implicit rejection of redundancy in direct-spending 
and tax-expenditure programs runs throughout the tax expenditure literature.  Although tax 
scholars rarely frame the issue in terms of redundancy, they regularly argue that either a 
direct-spending program or a tax-expenditure program is optimal to address a given policy 
problem.  One might conclude that tax scholars uniformly overlook the possibility that the 
combination of both direct spending and tax expenditures would be optimal.  Far more 
plausible, however, is the conclusion that, like Surrey, they implicitly reject redundancy. 
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In contrast to this general anti-redundancy position, the legal literature more 
recently has borrowed a prominent defense of redundancy from political 
science.  This heterodox analysis, which Martin Landau initiated more than 
forty years ago, identifies redundancy as a potential solution to reliability and 
agency problems.  Landau observed that engineers routinely depend on 
redundant mechanisms having independent risks of failure to improve the 
reliability of mechanical, electrical, and other systems.124  He offered the 
example of redundant safety features on commercial aircraft to illustrate the 
basic point that redundancy can sharply improve overall dependability.125  As 
he observed, a simple arithmetic increase in the number of independent 
mechanisms exponentially increases the prospects of overall system success – 
a “principle [that] lies at the foundation of the theory of redundancy.”126 
Landau’s insight was that the reliability benefit of redundancy could 
appropriately be extended to the design and implementation of administrative 
programs, such as “the defense departments, or the several independent 
information-gathering services of the government, or the large number of 
agencies engaged in technical assistance, or the various antipoverty programs, 
or the miscellany of agencies concerned with transportation.”127  Arguing 
against the “cardinal doctrine in public administration” that “duplication and 
overlap are wasteful,”128 Landau maintained that legislators might rationally 
assign redundant programs to separate administrative agencies in order to 
increase the overall prospect that at least one of the programs would succeed: 
“It can be hypothesized that it is precisely such redundancies that allow for the 
delicate process of mutual adjustment, of self-regulation, by means of which 
the whole system can sustain severe local injuries and still function 
creditably.”129  He did not, of course, argue that redundancy always works.130  
But he maintained that, by increasing flexibility and adaptability, “redundancy 
 
124 Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and 
Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 349 (1969). 
125 Landau, supra note 124, at 346.  Landau explained in a subsequent article:   
If, with respect to a particular system, the probability of failure is 1 in 100, what would 
the probability of simultaneous failure be if there were 2 such systems, each 
statistically independent, each rated equally?  What would the probability of 
simultaneous failure be for 3 such systems; for four, etc.?  For 2, the probability would 
be 1 in 10,000; for 3, 1 in a million; for 4, 1 in a hundred million.   
Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, 3 PUBLIUS 173, 187 (1973) 
[hereinafter Landau, Federalism].   
126 Landau, Federalism, supra note 125, at 187. 
127 Landau, supra note 124, at 351. 
128 Martin Landau, On Multiorganizational Systems in Public Administration, 1 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 11 (1991); see also Landau, supra note 124, at 348-49, 354-55. 
129 Landau, supra note 124, at 351. 
130 See Landau, Federalism, supra note 125, at 191. 
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serves many vital functions in the conduct of public administration”131 – in 
many cases making “the whole . . . more reliable than any of its parts.”132 
Staudt and Weisbach separately applied Landau’s argument to the 
redundancy of direct-spending and tax-expenditure programs.  They argued, 
for example, that implementation of overlapping programs for poverty relief 
may reduce the chance that the needy poor will not receive assistance.133  To 
the extent that the bureaucratic implementation of a direct-spending program 
fails to deliver assistance to certain individuals, the bureaucratic 
implementation of a tax-expenditure program may succeed.  They cautioned 
that this analysis depends on the risk of failure for the tax-expenditure 
program, administered by the Treasury Department, being wholly independent 
of the risk of failure for the direct-spending program, administered by the 
Department of Health and Human Services or another executive-branch 
agency. 
Other scholars have questioned Landau’s endorsement of redundancy.  
Michael Ting, another political scientist, assumed strategic decision-making 
both by legislative principals and by administrative agents to determine the 
conditions under which legislators rationally would enact redundant 
administrative programs.134  Ting argued that Landau’s “classic redundancy 
 
131 Landau, supra note 124, at 356.  O’Connell identifies several other potential benefits 
of redundancy: reducing “group think,” reducing agency capture, and increasing inter-
agency competition.  O’Connell, supra note 10, at 1676-78.  As with Landau’s “failsafe” 
analogy, these other benefits all point toward enhanced performance by administrative 
agencies implementing redundant administrative programs. 
132 Landau, Federalism, supra note 125, at 190.  Jonathan Bendor, one of Landau’s 
students, argued that redundant systems do not have to be completely independent in order 
to increase overall reliability.  See BENDOR, supra note 121, at 44-49.  For an argument 
distinguishing two different types of redundancy (duplication and overlap) and three 
different methods of implementing redundancy, see Allan W. Lerner, There Is More than 
One Way to Be Redundant: A Comparison of Alternatives for the Design and Use of 
Redundancy in Organizations, 18 ADMIN. & SOC. 334, 336 (1986).  For the development of 
normative criteria in assessing organizational redundancy, see Dan S. Felsenthal, Applying 
the Redundancy Concept to Administrative Organizations, 40 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247 (1980).  
For an early attempt to find empirical support for improved reliability under conditions of 
redundancy, see Dan S. Felsenthal & Eliezer Fuchs, Experimental Evaluation of Five 
Designs of Redundant Organizational Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 474 (1976).  For an 
argument that the redundancy of parallel systems is inadequate to maximize system 
reliability in administrative programs, see C. F. LARRY HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE RISKS: 
POLITICS, POLICY, AND RISKY TECHNOLOGIES (1998); C. F. Larry Heimann, Understanding 
the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems, 87 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 421 (1993).  For an analysis of redundancy in the delivery of local-
government services, see Rowan Miranda & Allan Lerner, Bureaucracy, Organizational 
Redundancy, and the Privatization of Public Services, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 193 (1995). 
133 See Staudt, supra note 17, at 1222-30; Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1839-43.  
134 Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 274, 275 (2003). 
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model” is “not robust to the introduction of strategic agents.”135  He found that, 
because of collective-action problems among multiple agents, redundancy 
increased overall reliability only when, for each agent, the probability of 
success was moderate and the cost of exerting effort was low.136  Ting also 
argued that Congress would be attracted to the competition that redundancy 
generates among bureaucratic agents when the preferences of the agents lie far 
from those of Congress but that redundancy may add no value in the case of 
agents sharing the objectives of legislators.137  In fact, he concluded, 
collective-action problems among redundant agents in such cases may actually 
reduce overall reliability (at least until the number of agents increases 
substantially).138 
By contrast, William Niskanen argued for redundancy as a solution to 
agency problems.  Niskanen modeled a legislature and a bureaucratic agency 
as parties in a bilateral monopoly with asymmetric information that gives the 
agency “the overwhelmingly dominant monopoly power.”139  He showed that 
the agency – which, unlike its legislative principal, knows the cost of providing 
the services demanded by the legislature – seeks the largest budget that the 
legislature is willing to provide, as long as the budget covers the agency’s cost 
of meeting the legislature’s demands.140  That, in turn, leads the agency to 
supply too much, relative to the social optimum, of the agency’s services.141  
Niskanen argued that competition among agencies for administrative programs 
– which presupposes redundancy – would improve agency performance and 
reduce the budgets provided by the legislature for a given level of agency 
output.142 
Others, in turn, have challenged Niskanen’s conclusions.  Gary Miller and 
Terry Moe refined Niskanen’s model by assuming different ranges for the 
 
135 Id. at 277. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 276, 286-87.  Ting found that the traditional control mechanism of retaining the 
power to terminate the agent would improve reliability; he called this “latent redundancy” – 
in effect, pitting the agent against itself in seriatim competition.  Id. at 276, 287. 
138 Id.  In an earlier article, Ting devised a game-theoretic model for the allocation of 
agency jurisdiction that, unlike the argument in Part I.A., does not depend on the 
congressional committee system.  See generally Michael M. Ting, A Theory of 
Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 364 (2002). 
139 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 30 
(1971). 
140 Id. at 45-52.  
141 Id. at 49-50.  
142 Id. at 195-201; see also William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J. L. & 
ECON. 617, 640-43 (1975).  Interestingly, Niskanen added the Landau reliability point to his 
argument for program redundancy: “One other effect of the competition among bureaus is 
likely to be a greater diversity of production processes, and this can be very important for 
services like national defense to insure against the catastrophic failure of any one process.”  
NISKANEN, supra note 139, at 198. 
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distribution of information and power between the bureaucratic agency and the 
legislative principal.143  Their approach yielded a wider range of outcomes, 
with cases of over-supply, under-supply, and optimal supply of agency 
services.144  Still, Miller and Moe generally found that the effects of 
competition among bureaucratic agencies – again, presupposing redundancy – 
“are uniformly beneficial.”145  By contrast, Weisbach argued that Niskanen’s 
analysis likely does not account for redundancy in direct spending and tax 
expenditures.146  He argued that the Treasury Department does not willingly 
compete with other agencies for non-tax programs and, in any event, “cannot 
break out [and, therefore, cannot reveal] the costs of administering most tax 
expenditures.”147 
In sum, the conventional approach to administrative redundancy in the 
academic literature generally has divided into two broad normative strands.  
The Friedman strand provides reasons for Congress to reject redundancy and, 
in the case of fiscal policy, either to prefer direct spending over tax 
expenditures or to prefer tax expenditures over direct spending.  The Landau 
strand offers reasons for Congress to choose redundancy, at least under certain 
conditions.  In both strands, analysis of Congress as an institution is 
orthogonal: The relevant point is to determine the optimal output of 
redundancy given existing institutional structures.148  But the legislative-
organization account set out in Part I.A implies that both strands of the 
 
143 Gary J. Miller & Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of 
Government, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 301 (1983).  More specifically, Miller and Moe 
assumed “two polar modes of legislative oversight” – a “demand revealing” mode 
(consistent with Niskanen’s assumption) and a “demand concealing mode” (not consistent 
with Niskanen’s assumption).  Id.  Another approach to the problem of relations between the 
legislature and bureaucratic agencies assumes that the principal (Congress) dominates the 
agents (bureaus).  See Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A 
Theory of Political Control of Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 589 (1989); 
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431, 433-34 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 243, 243-44 (1987). 
144 Miller & Moe, supra note 143, at 302-05.  Even in cases of over-supply of agency 
services, however, the amount of over-supply derived by Miller and Moe is smaller than that 
derived by Niskanen.  Id. at 309. 
145 Id. at 311.  The benefits of such redundancy and competition decrease, however, as 
legislative demand for the agency’s services increases.  Id. at 316. 
146 Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1843-45.  For related criticisms, see O’Connell, supra 
note 10, at 1679-82 (arguing that redundant structures may increase costs, decrease agency 
reliability, undermine the quality of agency decision-making, prevent cooperation, and 
generate agency errors). 
147 Weisbach, supra note 17, at 1845.   
148 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214. 
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conventional approach incorrectly assume away the underlying source of 
redundancy.  The institutional structures that facilitate the enactment of 
redundant legislation are embedded deeply within the congressional committee 
system, which implies  that the assessment of administrative redundancy 
should incorporate a better understanding of congressional committees as a 
phenomenon of legislative organization.  
II. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, DISTRIBUTIVE COSTS, AND 
INFORMATIONAL BENEFITS 
In recent years, political scientists have developed sophisticated accounts of 
the congressional committee system.  These accounts grew out of a renewed 
focus on institutionalism that itself developed in response to questions about 
the source of stability under majoritarian rule.  Most prominently, distributive 
theory and informational theory identify the committee system as an anchor of 
structural stability within Congress.149  But neither distributive theory nor 
informational theory has taken up the problem of administrative redundancy.  
Political theorists have not specifically considered the implications of 
redundancy for the distributive-theory account or the informational-theory 
account of the committee system.  Likewise, legal scholars have not considered 
the implications of informational theory or distributive theory for 
redundancy.150  This Part draws out those implications to assess the costs and 
benefits, in terms of legislative organization and process, of the institutional 
structures that support and facilitate redundancy.151   
 
149 Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional 
Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 10-21 (Kenneth A. 
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995).  Readers familiar with the literature may argue 
that political scientists have offered other theories of legislative organization.  See, e.g., 
Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Theories of Legislative Organization, APSA-CP 
NEWSLETTER (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Winter 2004, at 9 (surveying 
partisan and non-partisan theories of legislative organization); ERIC SHICKLER, DISJOINTED 
PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 5-
12 (2001) (surveying theories of legislative organization in connection with different 
“collective interests”).  However, informational theory and distributive theory provide the 
most traction on legislative committees.  For a theory of congressional committees arguing 
that committee preferences serve as counterweights to executive branch preferences, see 
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Legislative Organization Under Separate Powers, 17 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373 (2001). 
150 In her study of redundancy, Staudt briefly notes three theories of legislative 
organization (distributive, informational, and partisan) and their explanations of the 
committee system; she does not, however, develop the implications of the theories for 
redundancy or the implications of redundancy for the theories.  See Staudt, supra note 17, at 
1215.   
151 The analysis in this Part is similar to Anne O’Connell’s excellent analysis of the 
congressional-committee oversight of intelligence agencies.  See O’Connell, supra note 10, 
at 1691-99.  O’Connell evaluates the costs and benefits of legislative organizational 
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A.  Distributive Costs 
Viewing the congressional committee system through distributive theory 
implies, consistent with the Friedman strand, that administrative redundancy 
effects inefficiency and waste.  Under distributive theory, the committee 
system forms the basis for institutionalized logrolling and the production of 
interest-group legislation.  Redundancy, by extension, provides grease for bad 
legislative outcomes.  Indeed, the prevalence of redundancy implies that the 
interest-group legislation produced through legislative logrolling is worse than 
political theory otherwise suggests: it implies that Congress enacts redundant 
administrative programs specifically to spread the political benefits of 
constituent-favorable legislation as widely as possible throughout the House 
and the Senate.   
In broad terms, the distributive theory of legislative organization argues that 
legislators organize Congress to produce benefits such as “pork barrel 
projects, . . . expenditures targeted to their districts, and policy outcomes 
desired by favored constituents.”152  The theory reasonably assumes that 
legislators have heterogeneous policy preferences, that few such preferences 
are held by a majority of legislators, and that legislators may secure gains from 
trade by exchanging support across different measures.153  The “spot market” 
for trading votes, however, presents problems of enforceability and long-term 
stability; for example, an exchange of votes might involve benefits having 
different temporal streams, or the exchange itself might require asynchronous 
voting.154  Legislators therefore seek out institutional structures to facilitate 
both the formation and the enforcement of deals that deliver benefits to their 
constituents.155 
Distributive theory argues that Congress addresses the enforcement 
problems and the transaction costs of vote-trading by maintaining a system of 
committees that have independent jurisdictional authority and extensive 
 
structures primarily in terms of agency outcomes, and this Part evaluates the costs and 
benefits of such structures primarily in terms of legislative outcomes.  However, the two are 
obviously interrelated. 
152 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 149, at 7-8; see also C. Lawrence Evans, Legislative 
Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 605, 608-09 (1999).  
The preeminent account of the committee system under distributive theory is Barry R. 
Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988). 
153 Weingast & Marshall, supra note 152, at 133, 136-37. 
154 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 149, at 10-11; Weingast & Marshall, supra note 152, 
at 135, 138-42.  
155 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 149, at 12-13; Weingast & Marshall, supra note 152, 
at 142-43; see also Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional 
Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 246 (1979).  King characterizes distributive theory as 
showing “how a majoritarian institution (like Congress) with a strong committee system 
(like Congress) can produce nonmajoritarian policies (like pork-barrel projects benefiting 
the few at the expense of the many).”  KING, supra note 6, at 4. 
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agenda control.156  This committee system allows members to sort themselves 
according to the interests of their constituents.157  Legislators representing 
farming constituencies seek membership on the agriculture committees; 
legislators from the western states seek membership on the natural resources 
committees; legislators from the rust belt seek membership on the commerce 
committees or the labor committees.158  Within any particular committee, 
legislators can make readily enforceable deals without the need to trade votes 
across separate measures.159  Additionally, each committee holds almost 
unchecked agenda control – both positive and negative – over all matters 
within its jurisdiction. 
Distributive theory thus regards the committee system as “the formal 
expression of a comprehensive logrolling arrangement.”160  But the 
arrangement is not a market exchange of votes; rather, it is an exchange of 
institutional, committee-based rights.161  As described by distributive theory, 
“a legislator on committee i gives up influence over the selection of proposals 
in the area of committee j in exchange for members of committee j’s giving up 
their rights to influence proposals in area i.”162  For example, the Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in the Senate may produce 
measures that advance the interests of organized labor at the expense of 
employers (or vice versa), thereby also advancing the reelection, prestige, or 
policy objectives of the legislators serving on that committee.  Similarly, the 
Armed Services Committee in the Senate may produce measures that advance 
the interests of defense contractors, thereby securing advantages for the 
legislators on that committee.  But the committee system prevents the Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee from bringing to the floor any 
defense measure not approved by the Armed Services Committee and, 
likewise, prevents the Armed Services Committee from bringing to the floor 
 
156 Weingast & Marshall, supra note 152, at 143-48.   
157 Id. at 145-46.  The theory does not claim, however, that the committee-assignment 
process consists entirely of self-selection by legislators. 
158 Others find only limited support for that conclusion.  See, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, 
INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 117-22, 125-34 (1992).   
159 Weingast & Marshall, supra note 152, at 143-8.   
160 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 149, at 11-12 (quoting Morris Fiorina, Alternative 
Rationales for Restrictive Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337, 338 (1987)); see also John 
Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, 
in CONGRESS AND POLICY CHANGE 223, 224-25 (Gerald C. Wright, Jr. et al. eds., 1986). 
161 Weingast & Marshall, supra note 152, at 148.   
162 Id. at 145.  Note, however, that overlapping committee jurisdictions potentially 
weaken the exchange of committee-based rights.  To the extent that the jurisdictions of 
committee i and committee j overlap, the commitment by committee i not to legislate in the 
jurisdiction of committee j and the corresponding commitment by committee j not to 
legislate in the jurisdiction of committee i become less valuable. 
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any labor measure not approved by the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee.163 
The committees’ parliamentary prerogatives greatly strengthen this 
formalized logrolling arrangement.  Once a measure has left a committee’s 
direct control, floor amendments could undo intra-committee deals and 
resurrect the general enforceability problems of measure-by-measure vote 
trades.  But the parliamentary prerogatives stabilize ultimate legislative 
outcomes in favor of committee preferences.  When modeled as a simple 
divide-the-dollar game (an obvious exemplar for distributive politics), a 
committee’s proposal power and gate-keeping power allow the committee to 
secure outsized returns.164  The advantage to the committee is increased by its 
disproportionate representation in conference with the other chamber.165  By 
allowing committee chairs the authority to manage their committee’s 
legislation on the floor, by limiting, discouraging, or disallowing floor 
amendments, and by stacking the conference with members of the reporting 
committee, both the House and the Senate make it difficult for legislators not 
serving on the committee of jurisdiction to change a measure over the 
objection of that committee.  
This all implies a pessimistic view of administrative redundancy.  If the 
committee system institutionalizes logrolling for the production of interest-
group legislation, redundancy appears particularly objectionable – more 
objectionable, arguably, than even the Friedman strand implies.  Prior work in 
distributive theory, which has not taken redundancy into account, may actually 
understate how well the legislative process systematically advances interest-
group legislation.  Whether the legislative process is viewed from the demand 
side or the supply side, examination of redundancy reveals that the 
congressional committee system readily accommodates pressure for as much 
distributive legislation as possible.  These are the distributive costs of a 
committee system that produces redundancy. 
Consider the demand side first.  Public-choice theory, of course, has 
produced many theoretical and empirical accounts of interest groups seeking 
rents through the legislative process.  Distributive theory builds on those 
accounts by identifying the committee system as the institutional structure that 
legislators use to meet the rent-seeking demands of their constituents.  But the 
jurisdictional overlap and fragmentation that facilitate redundant programs 
 
163 That statement is true as to both the Senate and the House, but, in the case of the 
Senate, the absence of a germaneness rule allows any individual senator to offer a floor 
amendment that affects policy in almost any area on almost any pending measure (subject to 
the contrary terms of a unanimous consent agreement). 
164 See Baron & Ferejohn, supra note 117, at 353-65.  Proposal power without gate-
keeping power yields markedly smaller returns to the committee.  Id.; see also David P. 
Baron, A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1048, 1081-
82 (1989). 
165 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 83, at 86. 
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provide interest groups with multiple opportunities to seek rents.  From the 
perspective of an interest group, the presence of several committees in each 
chamber that can exercise jurisdiction over policy areas important to the 
interest group allows that group to shop among committees.  If one committee 
turns down a request for favorable legislation, a rival committee might be 
persuaded to grant the request in a different form through a different program.   
Colleges and universities, for example, might seek an increase in federal 
assistance for students enrolled at their institutions (working on the plausible 
assumption that the schools will capture any increased student aid through 
higher tuition and fees or through higher enrollment).  The education lobbyists 
might first approach the Education and the Workforce Committee on the 
House side and the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee on the 
Senate side.  If the lobbyists find that those committees are not disposed to be 
helpful, they might turn to the Science, Space, and Technology Committee in 
the House and the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee in the 
Senate to ask for an increase in science and engineering scholarships 
(reasoning that federal subsidies are fungible, after all).  Should that strategy 
fail, the lobbyists might approach the Agriculture Committee in the House and 
the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee in the Senate to request 
additional assistance for the colleges’ and universities’ agricultural programs.  
Even failure there should not be the end of the effort: The Ways and Means 
Committee in the House and the Finance Committee in the Senate have the 
authority to provide tax deductions, tax credits, and tax-exempt savings 
accounts to subsidize the costs of post-secondary education.166 
That would be the worst case for an interest group – to have to shop among 
different committees with overlapping jurisdictions in search of one that will 
provide a federal subsidy that another committee has denied.  A better case 
would be to shop among the committees to obtain a fiscal program redundant 
to one that another committee has already provided.  Nothing about the 
legislative process prevents an interest group from double dipping in the 
federal treasury, and the prevalence of redundancy confirms that the practice is 
routine.167  The lobbyists for colleges and universities may not have to choose, 
then, among general scholarships from the education committees, science and 
engineering scholarships from the science committees, agricultural 
scholarships from the agriculture committees, and educational tax preferences 
from the tax committees.168  Skillful advocacy may set up success in several 
 
166 For discussions of jurisdictional fragmentation and committee shopping, see KING, 
supra note 6, at 106, 143, and Staudt, supra note 17, at 1217-18. 
167 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 59-60 (concluding that redundant direct-
spending and tax-expenditure subsidies for ethanol will waste $5.7 billion of federal 
revenues in 2011). 
168 During the early 1970s, the Select Committee on Committees in the House did 
consider moving jurisdiction over agricultural colleges and science scholarships from the 
Agriculture Committee and the Science and Technology Committee to the Education and 
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committees, producing redundant subsidy programs.  And, if the lobbying 
efforts persuade multiple committees to advance favorable measures, the 
committees’ parliamentary prerogatives make it unlikely that the floor of either 
chamber will scale back or eliminate the redundant programs over committee 
objections.169 
Consider next the supply side.  The overlapping jurisdictions that facilitate 
committee shopping by interest groups also increase the opportunities for 
legislators to accept or extract cash or other benefits from those interest 
groups.170  Many legislators rely on campaign contributions, not only from the 
residents of their home states and districts but also from political action 
committees, trade associations, and lobbyists representing industries or 
activities that have no direct connection to their actual constituents.  Such 
interest-group contributions generally follow committee assignments.  A 
legislator serving on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in 
the Senate, for example, could justifiably anticipate direct or indirect financial 
contributions from organizations such as AARP, AHIP, the AMA, the NEA, 
the AFL-CIO, the SEIU, ABC, ERIC, ASPA, NAM, USCC, the BRT, ACLI, 
and many others.171  If the contributions from such an organization do not 
satisfy the legislator’s expectations, the legislator may find it expedient to 
 
Labor Committee.  DRAFT BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 11, 39. 
169 Elizabeth Garrett’s argument about interest-group competition for appropriated funds 
is not inconsistent with the double-dipping point.  She argues that certain constraints of the 
federal budget process force interest groups to compete for discretionary spending and for 
tax expenditures.  Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the 
Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 397-401 (1998).  She also argues, 
however, that there is very limited coordination of direct spending and tax expenditures 
across different policy areas (what she generally refers to as “budget functions”).  Id. at 406-
32.  For an argument contrary to the argument made in the text (that is, for an argument that 
redundancy may decrease opportunities for capture of congressional committees), see 
O’Connell, supra note 10, at 1692-93. 
170 The paradigmatic form of transfer from an interest group to a legislator may be the 
campaign contribution, but an interest group and a legislator chafing under the legal limits 
for campaign contributions can arrange for the group to fund, without limit, a college or 
university endowment honoring the legislator.  See Eric Lipton, Lawmakers Linked to 
Centers Endowed by Corporate Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010 at A1. 
171 AARP is a trade association representing middle-aged and elderly Americans; AHIP 
is a trade association representing employers providing health insurance to their employees; 
the AMA is a trade association representing physicians; the NEA is a labor union for 
primary- and secondary-school teachers; the AFL-CIO and the SEIU are associations of 
labor unions; ABC and ERIC are trade associations representing employers providing 
retirement and health plans to their employees; ASPA is a trade association representing 
retirement-plan actuaries; NAM and USCC are trade associations representing business; the 
BRT is a trade association representing chief executive officers of public companies; and 
ACLI is a trade association representing life insurance companies. 
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propose unfavorable legislation as a means of focusing the organization’s 
attention.172 
Representative Barney Frank’s fund-raising strategy illustrates how a 
legislator can readily convert a committee position into contributions from 
interest groups having business before the legislator’s committee.  
Representative Frank’s geographic constituency is the Fourth District of 
Massachusetts, a horn-shaped district running from the southern coast of 
Massachusetts into a narrow neck that curves through the central part of the 
eastern state.173  The district includes the towns of New Bedford, Taunton, 
Newton, and Brookline; it does not extend into the City of Boston.174  
Representative Frank appears to be very popular in the Fourth District; he won 
reelection in 2008 with more than two-thirds of the vote,175 and he won in the 
more challenging 2010 elections with a comfortable eleven-point margin.176  
But he is also very popular with financial-services companies and other 
financial institutions, few of which are resident in the Fourth District.  The 
reason is that Representative Frank was until recently the chair of the Financial 
Services Committee in the House.177  He made no apology for the connection 
between his position and the cash he receives.  While still chair of the 
committee, he stated flatly: “Financial services companies are inclined to give 
to me because I’m chairman of the committee important to their interests.”178 
Fragmenting jurisdiction over one policy area across multiple committees 
increases the number of legislators in Representative Frank’s position.  In the 
absence of jurisdictional fragmentation, interest groups might concentrate their 
cash on the members of only one committee in the House and one committee 
in the Senate, but fragmentation ensures that interest-group contributions 
instead are spread across many committees.  Insurance companies fall under 
the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Committee, but, with jurisdictional 
fragmentation, those companies may also find themselves affected by 
legislation from (among others) the Education and the Workforce Committee, 
the Energy and Commerce Committee, the Judiciary Committee, the Small 
 
172 See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection 
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1989) 
(arguing that legislators use tax-reform proposals to extract rents from interest groups). 
173 Congressman Barney Frank, HOUSE.GOV, http://www.house.gov/frank/district/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
174 Id. 
175 Campaign 08 Massachusetts Results, BOSTON.COM, http://www.boston.com/news/ 
politics/2008/election_results/massachusetts_results (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
176 Eric Moskowitz, After Defeating Bielat on Tuesday, Barney Is Back to Being Barney, 
BOS. GLOBE, November 7, 2010, at B-3. 
177 See Jim Puzzanghera & Richard Simon, Republicans Tussle over House Post, L.A. 
TIMES, November 09, 2010, at B-1. 
178 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & John Solomon, Democrats Offer up Chairmen for Donors; 
Party’s Campaigns Had Faulted GOP for “Selling Access,” WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2007, at 
A1.   
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Business Committee, the Veterans’ Affairs Committee, and the Ways and 
Means Committee.  Although the trade associations and lobbyists representing 
insurers may contribute disproportionately to members of the Financial 
Services Committee, they also have good reason to contribute to members of 
other committees.179 
The supply-side advantages of redundancy are particularly pronounced in 
the case of the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance Committee.  
Although tax policy is not the only area within their jurisdictions, it is arguably 
preeminent; in any event, it disproportionately contributes to the committees’ 
institutional stature.  In the absence of tax expenditures, exercise of the 
committees’ tax jurisdiction would consist principally of setting marginal tax 
rates, shutting down tax shelters, and closing loopholes.  That policy repertoire 
seems unlikely to attract the level of contributions that interest groups make to 
other standing committees holding the power to authorize federal subsidies.  
By regularly enacting, repealing, expanding, contracting, and otherwise 
modifying tax expenditures, however, the two tax committees attract the 
lobbying attention and the contributions of a very broad spectrum of interest 
groups.   
Consider the case of health care.  A tax code without tax expenditures would 
have little, perhaps nothing, to say about health care, and congressional activity 
on health care reform probably would bypass the tax committees entirely.  But, 
even before the enactment of health care reform in 2010, the tax code had 
prominent tax preferences and dispreferences for health care – including an 
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance,180 a deduction for health 
insurance purchased by self-employed individuals,181 an exclusion for health-
insurance benefits,182 a deduction for unreimbursed medical expenses,183 
exempt savings accounts for health care,184 and penalties for employer-
provided health plans that fail to meet any of numerous regulatory 
requirements.185  Those rules and the existing jurisdiction that they reflect 
made the tax committees key players in the recent congressional effort to 
reform health care.  Senator Max Baucus of Montana, the chair of the Finance 
Committee, leveraged that position into extensive interest-group 
contributions.186 
 
179 See also O’Connell, supra note 10, at 1706 (“Members [of Congress] may decline to 
eliminate redundancy in the administrative state in order to retain ‘pork’ for which they can 
claim credit . . . .”). 
180 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
181 Id. § 162(l). 
182 Id. § 105. 
183 Id. § 213. 
184 Id. §§ 220, 223. 
185 Id. §§ 4980B, 9801-03, 9811-12. 
186 Dan Eggen, Industry Cash Flowed to Drafters of Reform; Key Senator Baucus Is a 
Leading Recipient, WASH. POST, July 21, 2009, at A1. 
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These supply-side benefits for the Ways and Means Committee and the 
Finance Committee also help to explain why tax expenditures themselves tend 
to be redundant with respect to other tax expenditures.  By the most recent 
count of the Joint Committee on Taxation, for example, the tax code provides 
eight different tax preferences for agriculture, seventeen different tax 
preferences for education, and more than two dozen different tax preferences 
for energy.187  Unlike non-entitlement spending programs, which require 
regular authorization by the standing committees of jurisdiction and 
appropriations by the appropriations committees, tax-expenditure programs 
generally remain in effect until repealed.  Thus, the non-tax committees have 
cyclical opportunities to pursue distributive legislation by authorizing spending 
programs and making appropriations for those programs.  The tax committees, 
by contrast, face the problem of limited opportunities to provide legislative 
benefits to favored constituents and interest groups.  The Ways and Means and 
Finance Committees address that problem by making certain tax expenditures 
temporary.188  The opportunity to extend expiring tax expenditures makes 
those expenditures work like the direct-spending programs that require regular 
authorization and appropriations.  Better still – from the perspective of both the 
tax committees and the interest groups that seek favors from them – the tax 
committees also promote redundant tax expenditures, thereby renewing 
opportunities to confer benefits on groups that have secured past favors from 
the tax committees. 
In sum, distributive theory generally tells a pessimistic story about the 
legislative process.  Factoring administrative redundancy into the distributive-
theory account only makes a bad story worse, both from the demand side and 
from the supply side.  Distributive theory argues that Congress maintains its 
committees as a system of institutionalized logrolling so that legislators can 
provide legislative benefits to their constituents.  The addition of redundancy 
underscores the absence of any inherent limit to these negative-sum transfers.  
Fragmentation and overlap of committee jurisdiction allow interest groups, at 
worst, to shop among different committees for legislative benefits and, at best, 
to dip multiple times into the federal treasury; the parliamentary prerogatives 
of the standing committees then protect redundant interest-group legislation 
from meaningful change on the floor or in conference.   
B. Informational Benefits 
The informational-theory account of the congressional committee system 
suggests a much more optimistic view of administrative redundancy.  Although 
it does not specifically address redundancy, informational theory generally 
implies that Congress enacts redundant programs as a consequence of pursuing 
 
187 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 29-40 (Comm. Print 2010). 
188 See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and 
Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 239-40 (2009). 
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informational efficiency.  Informational theory argues that the congressional 
committee system serves the important purpose of providing legislators the 
opportunity and the incentive to invest in the acquisition of policy expertise.  
Thus, the theory implies that redundancy, as a by-product of the committee 
system, is an epiphenomenon of the broad institutional effort to improve 
decision-making in the legislative process.  Where distributive theory implies 
that redundancy is a downside of legislative organization, informational theory 
implies that redundancy is part of the organizational upside. 
Developed principally by political scientist Keith Krehbiel, informational 
theory asserts that the House and the Senate organize themselves into 
committees so that committee members can acquire and maintain policy 
expertise.189  The theory stands on two basic assumptions.  First, it assumes 
that institutional structures in Congress, including the committee system, are 
subject to the general principle of majoritarianism190 – in other words, that 
“institutional features are . . . selected by majorities, are subject to change by 
majorities, and therefore presumably serve the interests of majorities.”191  
Second, the theory assumes that legislators act under conditions of uncertainty 
about the instrumental relationship between legislative policies and non-
legislative (“real world”) outcomes.192  To address this informational problem, 
 
189 For the definitive statement of informational theory, see generally KREHBIEL, supra 
note 158.  For earlier papers constructing the theory, see Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith 
Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, 
33 AM. POL. SCI. REV.  459 (1989) [hereinafter Gilligan & Krehbiel, Asymmetric 
Information]; Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Choice Without Procedural 
Commitment, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS 295 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 
1989) [hereinafter Gilligan and Krehbiel, Collective Choice]; Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith 
Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale 
for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987) [hereinafter 
Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking]; Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, 
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531 
(1990) [hereinafter Gilligan & Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees].  For a 
different informational theory of legislative organization (which yields results that differ in 
certain cases from those of Gilligan and Krehbiel), see David P. Baron, Legislative 
Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 485, 485-86 (2000). 
190 KREHBIEL, supra note 158, at 15-19.  Krehbiel calls this the “majoritarian postulate” – 
that “[o]bjects of legislative choice in both the procedural and policy domains must be 
chosen by a majority of the legislature.”  Id. at 16. 
191 Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 149, at 14.  For criticism of Krehbiel’s assumption 
about majoritarianism, see David W. Rohde, Parties and Committees in the House: Member 
Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 119-29 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 
1995).  For a case study supporting majoritarian control through the floor median, see Keith 
Krehbiel, Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking 
Ban, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 234 (1996). 
192 KREHBIEL, supra note 158, at 20.  Krehbiel calls this the “uncertainty postulate” – that 
“[l]egislators are often uncertain about the relationship between policies and their 
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the theory argues, the legislature organizes itself into committees and grants 
the committees parliamentary prerogatives.   
The reasoning is straightforward.  Congress as a whole benefits from 
“informational efficiency” – that is, the “reduction of uncertainty in the course 
of the choice process.”193  But legislative pursuit of informational efficiency 
encounters the usual collective-action problems.  Policy expertise is costly to 
acquire and, once acquired by any one legislator, is potentially available to all 
legislators.  Thus, the “benefits of policy expertise will be realized only if 
institutional arrangements are such that some legislators have strong incentives 
to specialize and to share their expertise with their fellow legislators.”194  By 
assigning individual legislators to specific committees with independent 
jurisdictions, Congress provides those legislators with the opportunity to 
develop expertise in particular policy areas.195  For example, members of the 
Ways and Means Committee, who exercise jurisdiction in the House over 
revenue matters, and members of the Education and the Workforce Committee, 
who exercise jurisdiction in the House over labor-management relations, can 
acquire much greater expertise in tax law and in labor law, respectively, than 
other legislators not serving on those committees.  By establishing and 
maintaining committees that cover the entire policy spectrum, the House and 
the Senate each attempt to create an institutional reservoir of specialized 
knowledge.196 
Committee members, however, rationally may not want to reveal their 
policy expertise to the full chamber.197  In a heterogeneous legislature, the 
ideal point of the committee’s median member may differ from the ideal point 
of the floor’s median legislator,198 and committee members may be concerned 
that the floor will use the committee’s revealed expertise to move a policy 
position away from that preferred by the committee.199  The floor can attempt 
 
outcomes.”  Id. at 20.  For a more detailed discussion of Krehbiel’s distinction between 
policy and outcome, see id. at 66-68. 
193 Id. at 74; cf. id. at 269 (“Informational efficiency refers to the precision of the 
inference the legislature draws from the committee’s equilibrium behavior, that is, the 
clarity of the received signal.”). 
194 Id. at 64. 
195 Id. at 68-69; Gilligan & Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees, supra 
note 189, at 546 (“[T]he [legislative] committee is superfluous when it possesses no special 
expertise.”); see also FINAL BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 25 (“The 
committee system is used to provide division of labor and specialization to bring added 
competence to the Members.”); DRAFT BOLLING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 26, at 81 
(rejecting mandatory rotation of legislators among committees because “mandatory rotation 
reduces the expertise of Congressmen”). 
196 KREHBIEL, supra note 158, at 66-81; see also Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 149, at 
15-16. 
197 KREHBIEL, supra note 158, at 69. 
198 Id. at 77-78, 81-82. 
199 Gilligan & Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees, supra note 189, at 547. 
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to read the committee’s positions on particular legislative measures as signals 
about its expert evaluation of those measures, but the signals can be 
deceptive.200  Informational theory argues that, to overcome these difficulties 
and to encourage committee members to reveal their policy expertise, 
Congress grants the committees parliamentary prerogatives.201  Thus, if the 
House floor provides a closed rule for a tax measure reported favorably by the 
Ways and Means Committee, the floor effectively commits not to turn any 
information revealed by the committee to the committee’s disadvantage, such 
as by amending the measure to strip out tax preferences for the constituents of 
committee members.202  The prerogatives increase the prospects that the 
committee will “credibly transmit[] private information to get a [floor] 
majority to do what is in the majority’s interest.”203 
This implies that redundancy – as a function of the jurisdictional overlap 
and the parliamentary prerogatives embedded in the congressional committee 
system – contributes to better legislative decision-making.  Consider again the 
example of multiple committees in the House reporting legislation to establish 
subsidy programs for post-secondary education.  The Education and the 
Workforce Committee authorizes a general college-scholarship program 
administered by the Department of Education; the Science, Space, and 
Technology Committee authorizes a science-scholarship program administered 
by the National Science Foundation; the Agriculture Committee authorizes an 
agricultural-college-scholarship program administered by the Agriculture 
Department; and the Ways and Means Committee authorizes a college-expense 
 
200 KREHBIEL, supra note 158, at 69-70, 269 n.16. 
201 Id. at 90-92, 109 n.1; Gilligan & Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information, supra note 189, 
at 462-63, 476-81, 486; Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Choice, supra note 189, at 310; 
Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking, supra note 189, at 290, 317-25.  For an 
argument that committee specialization is sustained by committee expectations of floor 
deference, see Daniel Diermeier, Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 344, 344 (1995). 
202 KREHBIEL, supra note 158, at 97-98.  That said, informational theory generally 
predicts that Congress grants parliamentary prerogatives such as the closed rule more 
readily to heterogeneous committees comprising non-outlier members.  Id. at 97-99. 
203 Id. at 76.  Krehbiel argues that informational theory has both a “distributional logic” 
and an “informational logic” to account for the parliamentary prerogatives granted to 
committees.  Id. at 91-92.  The distributional logic centers on the straightforward claim that 
granting parliamentary prerogatives to committees allows those committees to take a 
disproportionate share of the resources under their jurisdictions.  Id. at 91-92.  The 
informational logic is more problematic.  Here, Krehbiel argues that “everyone in the 
legislature benefits from revelation of policy expertise, independent of the distributional 
properties of realized outcomes.”  Id. at 92.  Thus, “[c]ommittees not only may get the 
distributional bonus if they specialize; they also share the common good of informational 
efficiency.”  Id.  That, however, simply raises the familiar collective-action problem: Why 
would committee members bear the disproportionate burden of developing specialized 
policy expertise only to draw a proportionate share of its benefits? 
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tax deduction or tax credit administered by the Treasury Department.  The 
Friedman strand in the conventional account would consider the four programs 
to be a paradigmatic example of wasteful duplication.  At a minimum, the 
science-scholarship program and the agricultural-college-scholarship program 
could be collapsed into the general college-scholarship program; better still, 
the education tax preferences could also be folded into the general scholarship 
program (or vice versa). 
Informational theory’s explanation of the committee system suggests instead 
that redundancy follows from a legislative structure aimed at narrowing the 
uncertainty between legislative policy decisions and the non-legislative effects 
of those decisions.  The House expects that the Education and the Workforce 
Committee will develop expertise in general education policy, which positions 
the committee members to design a scholarship program generally meeting the 
needs of most college students.  But a general scholarship program may not be 
optimal for technical fields.  Perhaps experts believe that subsidies for science, 
engineering, and agriculture students should be larger than subsidies for other 
college students in order to attract students to technical disciplines.  Perhaps 
experts believe that subsidies in science, engineering, and agriculture should be 
granted on the basis of demonstrated technical ability, as rewards for 
developing promising experimental projects, or on another merit basis.  The 
particularized expertise developed by the Science, Space, and Technology 
Committee and the Agriculture Committee may put the members of those 
committees in a better position, relative to the generalists in education policy 
serving on the Education and the Workforce Committee, to assess the claims of 
science, engineering, and agriculture experts, to fashion appropriate 
scholarship programs, and to oversee the administration of those programs 
through the National Science Foundation and the Agriculture Department.  On 
this interpretation, redundancy is not the pointless waste of resources suggested 
by the Friedman strand; rather, it is a manifestation of desirable committee 
specialization.204 
Interestingly, this account appears somewhat weaker, at least initially, for 
redundancy involving tax expenditures.  The expertise of the House and Senate 
 
204 See also O’Connell, supra note 10, at 1691 (arguing that redundancy in legislative 
oversight “may yield a higher chance of success in achieving a particular goal because 
different committees may have different expertise”); id. at 1693 (“Redundancy in the 
committee system may . . . increase the number of members of Congress with knowledge 
about the intelligence community.”); Staudt, supra note 17, at 1205-06 (“By giving 
responsibility for food stamps to the House Agriculture Committee, . . . Congress enables 
the group of legislators with the greatest expertise in food production, distribution, and 
consumption to design the policies intended to guarantee that the poor have food and 
nourishment.  Similarly, the House Education and [the] Workforce Committee members 
have built up the expertise and knowledge necessary to assure Congress pursues the best 
policies for school children and laborers.”).  Of course, like the Landau strand in the 
conventional account, this informational-theory interpretation does not justify unlimited 
redundancy.   
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tax committees includes tax policy, trade policy, and other areas within their 
exclusive jurisdiction.  But the two committees do not necessarily develop 
expertise in all the policy areas that they reach through tax expenditures.  Tax-
policy expertise puts the Ways and Means Committee in a superior position, 
relative to the other committees in the House, to design a tax deduction or a tax 
credit, but it does not necessarily put the Ways and Means Committee in a 
superior (or even comparable) position to design a tax deduction or a tax credit 
for post-secondary education expenses.  A sound tax expenditure for post-
secondary education expenses requires (or should require) relevant expertise 
about education policy, which, under the committee system, resides in the 
Education and the Workforce Committee.205 
The great breadth of tax expenditures – covering everything from 
agriculture to veterans – suggests two possibilities, neither of which sits well 
with informational theory’s account of the committee system.  First, it may be 
that the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance Committee simply 
produce tax expenditures covering policy areas in which they have no 
particular expertise.  Thus, when designing a tax deduction or a tax credit for 
post-secondary education expenses, the tax-writing committees may work on 
the basis of information no better than that of any other legislator not serving 
on one of the education committees.  Second, it may be that the tax committees 
in fact develop expertise in the many policy areas reached by tax expenditures.  
Thus, in addition to becoming expert in tax policy, the Ways and Means 
Committee and Finance Committee members may also develop specialized 
knowledge about agriculture, energy, and veterans (among many other topics).  
Still, it seems implausible that the tax committees would develop expertise 
comparable to that of the other twenty standing committees in the House and 
the other seventeen standing committees in the Senate.   
Nonetheless, the redundancy of tax-expenditure programs may still serve an 
important informational purpose.  Because the Ways and Means Committee 
and the Finance Committee have exclusive jurisdiction over tax policy, the 
other standing committees can deliver subsidies only through direct-spending 
programs.  The Education and the Workforce Committee, the Science, Space, 
and Technology Committee, and the Agriculture Committee in the House, for 
example, can authorize general or specialized scholarship programs funded 
through federal appropriations,206 but those committees cannot create tax 
 
205 Edward Kleinbard argues that “[c]ontemporary tax expenditure practices have 
elevated the tax-writing committees into a special status [–] a Congress within the 
Congress” – because those committees both raise and spend revenues.  Edward D. 
Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget 
and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
206 This is not to suggest that such committees have sole responsibility for direct 
spending.  In both the House and the Senate, any program authorizations generally require 
separate appropriations by the appropriations committees.  Also, both the authorization 
process and the appropriation process are subject to the general control of the budget 
committees. 
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preferences for post-secondary education.  Although direct-spending and tax-
expenditure programs may be similar, they may also differ along several 
margins, including efficacy, efficiency, and equity.  Those differences suggest 
possible informational benefits from redundancy.  By establishing and 
maintaining redundant direct-spending and tax-expenditure programs – for 
example, government-provided scholarships and education tax credits – 
Congress can experiment with different policy instruments in different 
contexts.  If the standing committees incorporate such feedback into their 
policy expertise, legislative information should improve, and legislative 
decisions should become better over time.207 
Even if redundancy contributes to desirable informational efficiency, 
however, there is a separate question about the amount of redundancy in 
federal legislation.  At first pass, the pervasiveness of redundancy suggests that 
the House and the Senate may be over-investing in policy expertise: Too many 
committees have too much jurisdictional overlap and produce too many 
redundant programs directed at common policy objectives.  Although the 
House legitimately may want the Science, Space, and Technology Committee 
and the Agriculture Committee to bring their expertise to bear when the House 
makes decisions about subsidizing education in technical fields, the House may 
needlessly allow or encourage the committees to develop expertise duplicating 
that developed by the Education and the Workforce Committee.  Similarly, the 
House may want to experiment with subsidies for post-secondary education 
through direct spending and tax expenditures, but there is no apparent reason 
for the Ways and Means Committee to become expert in education policy – as 
opposed to combining its tax-policy expertise with the Education and the 
Workforce Committee’s education-policy expertise. Pervasive redundancy 
initially suggests that Congress does not have too little information about the 
instrumental effects of its policy interventions; instead, Congress may have too 
much of that information.  If correct, that view would confirm the position, 
advanced in the Friedman strand, that redundancy is a symptom of government 
dysfunction.   
A second and closer look at the question, however, suggests a different 
conclusion.  The conventional account demonstrates that, quite apart from the 
number of redundant administrative programs and the amount of resources 
devoted to them, Congress does a very poor job of rationally coordinating 
different programs.  Friedman showed, for example, that Congress in the early 
1960s was spending far more on “direct welfare payments and programs” than 
was necessary simply to raise the poorest households above the median 
 
207 See generally Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 
(2008).  That said, the informational justification of redundant direct-spending and tax-
expenditure programs is undermined by the apparent unwillingness of Congress to repeal 
programs on either the direct-spending side or the tax-expenditure side after Congress has 
observed which approach better serves its policy objectives. 
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household income.208  Shaviro demonstrated that the benefit levels and income 
phase-outs of certain direct-spending and tax-expenditure programs for poverty 
relief combined to produce extraordinary marginal tax rates – ranging from a 
low of negative 26% to a high of 110% – on lower-income taxpayers.209  These 
problems are not a function of redundant programs per se; rather, they are a 
function of badly coordinated redundant programs.  The failure to ensure 
proper coordination among programs implies that Congress invests too little, 
rather than too much, in policy expertise.  No doubt it would be impracticable 
for legislators themselves to identify and understand inter-program problems 
such as those analyzed by Friedman and Shaviro.  But the standing committees 
have professional staffs that include lawyers, economists, and policy analysts 
of high caliber.  Those professionals do not lack the intellectual capacity or the 
technical training to identify coordination problems among different programs 
– or, at a minimum, to understand the exposition of such problems by 
academics and executive branch officials.  
This suggests that Congress should increase its investment in policy 
expertise.  To guide the legislature toward better policy interventions, the 
standing committees should understand more than just the instrumental 
relationship between legislative policies and non-legislative outcomes, and 
they should understand more than just the parameters of each direct-spending 
or tax-expenditure program in isolation.  To serve the informational needs of 
the legislature, the committees should also understand how each direct-
spending and tax-expenditure program interacts with every other direct-
spending and tax-expenditure program in the same policy domain.  The 
apparent fact that committees readily propose, maintain, and oversee fiscal 
programs but do not understand how those programs mesh with similar 
programs falling under the jurisdiction of other committees suggests that the 
legislature as a whole realizes something less than full informational 
efficiency. 
Members of Congress appear to understand this point, at least in the context 
of particular programs.  In addition to several tax deductions210 and non-
taxable savings accounts211 for education, Congress provides funding for post-
secondary education through tax credits administered by the Treasury 
Department212 and direct-spending programs administered by the Department 
 
208 FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 193. 
209 Shaviro, supra note 16, at 479-80.  The irrational results, he said, resembled 
“something designed by a drunk, or perhaps a chimpanzee.”  Id. at 469. 
210 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 221 (2006) (tax deduction for interest on certain student loans); 
id. § 222 (tax deduction for certain education expenses). 
211 See, e.g., id. § 529 (tax exemption for qualified tuition program); id. § 530 (tax 
exemption for Coverdell education savings account). 
212 See id. § 25A (Hope Scholarship Credit, American opportunity tax credit, and the 
Lifetime Learning Credit). 
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of Education.213  The redundancy of these higher-education programs has 
raised coordination questions.  In the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (the economic-stimulus bill enacted shortly after President Obama 
took office), Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary 
of Education to study the interaction of the education tax credits and the 
federal Pell Grant program and to report to Congress on “how to coordinate the 
credit[s] . . . with the . . . Pell Grant program . . . to maximize their 
effectiveness at promoting college affordability.”214  That approach, which 
leverages executive-branch policy expertise to improve the information 
available to congressional tax and education committees, represents a sensible 
expansion of legislative informational efforts. 
A third and still closer look at the problem reveals yet another set of 
conclusions.  Arguably, as Jonathan Bendor maintained, one should distinguish 
between redundancy in program design and redundancy in program 
implementation.215  The establishment and maintenance of redundant direct-
spending and tax-expenditure programs may, as Landau’s analysis argues, 
increase overall reliability and may, as informational theory implies, improve 
the policy expertise available to congressional committees about program 
effects.  But direct spending and tax expenditures are costly, and, as the 
Friedman strand demonstrates, they can result in waste, inefficiency, and 
irrationality.  By contrast, redundancy in the design of direct-spending and tax-
expenditure programs allows multiple committees to cultivate expertise in a 
single policy area.  That potentially sets the committees up to compete against 
each other, thereby furthering – rather than undermining – the institutional goal 
of informational efficiency.   
Again, Congress seems to understand this point, at least in limited contexts.  
When the House created the Homeland Security Committee in 2005, for 
example, House leaders intentionally created jurisdictional overlap between the 
new committee and other standing committees.216  The chair of the Rules 
Committee argued in favor of the arrangement on informational grounds: “We 
envision a system of purposeful redundancy.  By that, we mean . . . more than 
one level of oversight and an atmosphere in which the competition of ideas is 
encouraged.”217  Perhaps that approach should be expanded and improved: 
 
213 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a to 1070a-1 (2006) (Federal Pell Grant program). 
214 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 1004(f)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 115, 315. 
215 Bendor drew the distinction between redundancy in planning and redundancy in 
operating urban transit systems.  See BENDOR, supra note 121, at 67-79.   
216 OLESZEK, supra note 58, at 85.   
217 Id. at 85 (quoting Representative David Drier).  King, although not discussing 
redundancy, drew a similar conclusion about the practice of referring a single measure to 
multiple committees: “When different aspects of complex issues are handled in multiple 
committees, the expertise and experience in each committee can be tapped. . . .  Some 
degree of fragmentation may be informationally efficient because there are more people at 
the table when important decisions are being made.”  KING, supra note 6, at 144 (internal 
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perhaps Congress should more broadly encourage redundancy in legislative 
design but avoid redundancy in program implementation. 
In sum, informational theory implies that redundancy directly and indirectly 
serves useful and appropriate legislative ends (although the case is weaker for 
tax expenditures that draw the tax-writing committees beyond the boundaries 
of tax policy).  As understood through informational theory, the point of the 
congressional committee system is to achieve informational efficiency by 
increasing internal policy expertise.  To foreclose all administrative 
redundancy would require a fundamental restructuring of the committee 
system, which would risk undercutting the informational benefits that the 
system is intended to achieve.  Thus, the enactment and maintenance of 
redundant administrative programs involves a trade-off between distributive 
costs and informational benefits.  Even if administrative redundancy inevitably 
produces waste, as members of the House and the Senate spread federal 
largesse as broadly as possible, it is possible that those costs are outweighed, in 
certain cases, by improvements in the policy information available to 
Congress.218 
C. A Case Study of Redundant Retirement-Security Programs 
The various retirement-security programs enacted and maintained by 
Congress illustrate the distributive costs and informational benefits associated 
with administrative redundancy.  Congress could maintain one comprehensive 
program to support the material and physical welfare of older Americans.  The 
program could provide annual demogrants to anyone who has attained a 
designated age.  Those payments could be flat for all recipients, or they could 
vary along any of several dimensions, such as the recipient’s health, marital 
status, income, and wealth.  A single federal agency could administer the 
program, and a single committee within each congressional chamber could 
oversee that agency’s activities.  Instead, Congress has divided federal support 
for older Americans into multiple overlapping programs administered by 
several agencies, which, in turn, are overseen by multiple committees.  Most 
prominent among these are Social Security, Medicare, and certain tax 
expenditures and regulatory programs.219 
Social Security, the federal government’s largest wealth-redistribution 
program,220 provides retirement benefits (as well as survivor and disability 
 
quotation marks omitted); see also Staudt, supra note 17, at 1219 (arguing that 
“[o]verlapping jurisdictions assure that heterogeneous groups put together proposals for 
floor votes,” that the multiple-referral procedure “avoids the political biases that can emerge 
when a single committee has a policy monopoly,” and that “redundant and overlapping 
control over policy areas fosters communication and consensus within the legislature prior 
to the time an initiative reaches the floor”). 
218 Cf. NISKANEN, supra note 139, at 219-20. 
219 This list is not exhaustive. 
220 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 19 (2005). 
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benefits) to 53 million people.221  Congress finances the program with 
employment taxes,222 self-employment taxes,223 and income taxes on the 
benefits of certain program participants.224  Through the payment of cash 
benefits to program participants and their beneficiaries, Social Security 
mitigates the risk that retirement, death, or disability will result in lost or 
reduced income.  Retirement benefits are determined as a function of the 
participant’s earnings under a progressive benefit formula.225  These benefits, 
which are payable both to the participant and to the participant’s spouse,226 are 
actuarially adjusted for early or late commencement227 and are indexed for 
changes in the cost of living.228  Survivor and disability benefits generally are 
determined under modified versions of the benefit formula used for retirement 
benefits.229  The taxation side of Social Security is administered by the 
Treasury Department; the benefits side is administered by the Social Security 
Administration.  In Congress, the Social Security program falls principally 
within the jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee. 
The Medicare program provides health insurance and health care benefits to 
46.3 million Americans.230  Financed in part by general revenues and in part by 
employment taxes231 and self-employment taxes,232 Medicare comprises four 
parts.  Part A provides payments for hospital, nursing-home, and hospice 
care;233 Part B provides payments for physician, outpatient, and home-health 
services;234 Part C, an alternative to Parts A and B, allows individuals to 
 
221 THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND 
FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, THE 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-137, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT]. 
222 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2006). 
223 Id. § 1401(a). 
224 Id. §§ 86, 871(a)(3). 
225 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)-(b) (2006). 
226 Id. § 402(b)-(d). 
227 Id. § 402(q), (w). 
228 Id. § 415(i). 
229 Id. §§ 402(d)-(i), 423. 
230 THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS 
OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY 
MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 5 (2010) [hereinafter MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT].   
231 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b). 
232 Id. § 1401(b).   
233 Part A is the Hospital Insurance program.  MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 
230, at 1. 
234 Id. 
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participate in “Medicare Advantage” and similar plans;235 and Part D provides 
prescription-drug benefits.236  The Department of Health and Human Services 
administers the Medicare program, and several congressional committees 
claim jurisdiction over it.  Most important among these are the Finance and 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees in the Senate and the 
Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means Committees in the House. 
Congress also maintains programs providing less direct support for 
retirement security, the most salient of which are the tax and regulatory 
programs under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA).  ERISA comprises a system of federal tax expenditures to subsidize 
employment-based and individual retirement savings,237 a system of regulatory 
protections for employees participating in employer-sponsored retirement 
plans,238 and a system of pension insurance to spread the costs of plan failure 
across all insured plans.239  Additionally, Congress maintains several stand-
alone tax expenditures for older Americans.240  The retirement provisions of 
ERISA are administered by three agencies: the Treasury Department, the 
Labor Department, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.241  Tax 
expenditures for older Americans are administered by the Treasury 
Department.  Four committees in Congress exercise direct oversight for ERISA 
and the tax expenditures: the Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committees in the Senate and the Education and the Workforce and 
Ways and Means Committees in the House. 
Social Security, Medicare, and the retirement tax expenditures and 
regulatory regimes unquestionably overlap in their functions and objectives: 
Together, they implement redundant federal support for the financial security 
 
235 Id.   
236 Id.  Together, Parts B and D constitute the Supplementary Medical Insurance 
Program.  Id. 
237 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 25B (2006) (tax credit for contributions to employer-sponsored 
retirement plans, individual retirement accounts, and individual retirement annuities); id 
§ 219 (deduction for contributions to individual retirement accounts and individual 
retirement annuities); id. §§ 402, 402A, 403 (preferential taxation of employees and 
beneficiaries covered by employer-sponsored retirement plans); id. § 404 (deduction for 
contributions to employer-sponsored retirement plans); id. §§ 408, 408A (tax exemption for 
individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities and preferential taxation 
of individuals covered by individual retirement accounts and individual retirement 
annuities); id. § 501 (tax exemption for employer-sponsored retirement plans). 
238 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1191C (2006). 
239 Id. §§ 1301-1461. 
240 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 22 (tax credit for taxpayers sixty-five and older); id. § 63(f) 
(increased standard deduction for taxpayers sixty-five and older). 
241 Within a few years of enactment, the overlap in ERISA administration became too 
much even by government standards, and President Carter’s Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 
1978 eliminated part of the redundancy between the Treasury Department and the Labor 
Department.  Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. (2006). 
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of older Americans.  Perhaps Congress intentionally divides retirement-
security support into several programs to capture the reliability benefits 
suggested by the Landau strand of the conventional account.  If an individual 
fails to make use of the tax expenditures available for private savings, Social 
Security generally ensures that the individual will not fall below the poverty 
line; if an individual’s private savings and Social Security benefits cannot 
provide adequate health care, Medicare relieves the burden; and if an 
individual’s post-retirement consumption needs exceed the benefits available 
under Social Security and Medicare, private savings – subsidized through tax 
expenditures – may cover the shortfall.  More likely, however, the redundancy 
is a by-product of the congressional committee system.  By expanding federal 
retirement programs beyond tax subsidies and Social Security, both of which 
fall within the jurisdiction of the tax-writing committees, several other 
committees – including the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
Committee, the House Education and the Workforce Committee, and the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee – have been able to assert legislative 
authority over a policy domain of immediate concern to many of their 
constituents.  
That legislative authority includes substantial distributive benefits.  Direct 
outlays in 2009 under the Old-Age Supplemental Insurance portion of Social 
Security – a program controlled by the Senate Finance and House Ways and 
Means Committees – totaled $564.3 billion.242  Direct outlays in 2009 under 
Parts A, B, and D of Medicare – programs controlled by the Finance and 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committees in the Senate and the 
Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce Committees in the House – 
totaled $509 billion.243  Tax expenditures in fiscal year 2009 for retirement 
security – controlled by the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
Committees – totaled $158.6 billion.244  Collectively, the programs cost $1.23 
trillion – almost one-tenth of the U.S. gross domestic product in 2009.245  If 
that sum were simply distributed as cash payments to the approximately 40 
million Americans aged sixty-five or over, each would receive $30,750 – 
several thousand dollars more than the U.S. per capita income of $26,530.246  
Additionally, regulation of the private pension system through ERISA – which 
 
242 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 221, at 5. 
243 MEDICARE TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 230, at 10.   
244 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 42-44.  This sum includes forgone 
tax revenue attributable to the exemption of Social Security and Medicare benefits but does 
not include any revenue effects of traditional individual retirement accounts and individual 
retirement annuities (because those effects were skewed by unusual circumstances 
prevailing for 2009). 
245 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDING, FOURTH QUARTER 2009, at 13 tbl.F.6 (2010). 
246 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 13 (2010). 
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falls under the jurisdiction of the Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committees in the Senate and the Ways and Means and Education 
and the Workforce Committees in the House – gives the committees legislative 
authority over $5.5 trillion of private savings.247 
The advantages of retirement-security redundancy for legislators are readily 
apparent.  By exercising authority over programs involving such enormous 
sums, these five congressional committees ensure that their agendas address 
matters of importance to their older constituents and command the attention of 
the trade associations and lobbying firms that represent the individuals and 
businesses dependent on the status quo.  Additionally, by setting the terms 
under which nearly ten percent of the U.S. gross domestic product flows into 
the federal government as taxes and out of the government as benefits, the 
committees also protect their own status and prestige within Congress.  Every 
legislator has elderly constituents, and every legislator takes a genuine interest 
in retirement-security programs.  Whether these programs could be 
administered more cheaply in non-redundant form would seem beside the 
point.  The redundancy allows multiple committees in each chamber to 
participate in determining who gets what under the largest component of the 
government’s social welfare system. 
But the redundancy of retirement-security programs also brings 
informational benefits to the lawmaking process.  The committees claiming 
legislative authority over retirement security develop overlapping but 
nonetheless distinct expertise consistent with the other policy matters within 
their specific jurisdictions.  Thus, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
specialize in health policy to a greater degree than the other committees; the 
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee 
specialize in taxes, tax expenditures, and cash transfer programs; and the 
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee and the House 
Education and the Workforce Committee specialize in the reporting and 
disclosure requirements and fiduciary standards applicable to employer-
sponsored pension arrangements.  By differentiating retirement-security 
legislation into several programs, Congress is able to leverage the particular 
expertise of its committees to address specific problems.   
Which effect of the retirement-security redundancy is stronger – the 
distributive costs or the informational benefits?  The staggering amounts spent 
each year by Congress to provide cash payments and health care to older 
Americans suggest that the distributive costs are considerable.  Certainly 
Congress could meet the legitimate needs of the elderly under a streamlined 
system costing less than the nearly ten percent of gross domestic product 
currently devoted to retirement-security support.  Whatever portion of the 
$1.23 trillion might be saved under a non-redundant approach should be put 
down to waste and inefficiency.  On the other hand, the informational benefits 
 
247 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 245, at 77 tbl.L.118.  
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of retirement-security redundancy are no doubt substantial.  Splitting Medicare 
off from Social Security allows Congress to develop the expertise needed to 
tailor a federal subsidy program to the particular demands of geriatric 
medicine; splitting ERISA off from Social Security allows Congress to 
develop the expertise needed to structure appropriate incentives to induce 
voluntary private savings.  Arguably, the informed design of Social Security, 
Medicare, and ERISA better serves retirement security than could a non-
redundant system of demogrants.  The incommensurability of the distributive 
downside and the informational upside make comparative evaluations difficult.  
But perhaps it is sufficient to see that redundancy entails both costs that the 
conventional account generally recognizes and benefits that the conventional 
account completely overlooks.  Redundancy, even when distributively 
wasteful, reflects the informational goals of the committee system. 
III. REDUNDANCY AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
The conventional academic account of administrative redundancy has 
reform implications markedly different from those of the legislative-
organization account developed in Parts I and II.  The conventional account 
generally analyzes redundancy without regard to institutional context and, 
consequently, proposes reforms without considering the place of congressional 
structures in those reforms.248  In short, the conventional account focuses on 
deriving the optimal level of administrative redundancy from existing 
institutional structures in Congress.  By contrast, the legislative-organization 
account shows that attempts to change administrative redundancy inevitably 
require change to the congressional committee system, thereby drawing into 
play the trade-off between distributive costs and informational benefits.  
Against that background, this Part considers the possibility of institutional 
reform that takes the trade-off into account. 
Both the anti-redundancy and the pro-redundancy positions in the 
conventional account effectively assume that legislators can and should make 
specific policy determinations about the desirable level of redundancy.  The 
Friedman strand implies that Congress should eliminate redundant 
administrative programs whenever possible.  The Landau strand implies that 
Congress should pursue redundancy in the cases where redundancy yields 
enhanced program reliability.  Both policy prescriptions assume that 
sufficiently thoughtful analysis will yield workable conclusions about when 
redundancy is good and when it is not and that those conclusions will provide 
the basis for policy choices producing better administrative programs.  The 
legislative organizational structures of Congress remain orthogonal; the 
relevant question for the conventional analysis is simply how much or how 
little redundancy to produce, given the existing institutional arrangements. 
By contrast, the legislative-organization account makes clear that any 
substantial change in the quantum of administrative redundancy requires 
 
248 Important exceptions here are Niskanen and Miller and Moe.  See supra Part I.B. 
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institutional reform.  Congress generally enacts and maintains redundant 
administrative programs because the committee system skews policy outcomes 
in favor of redundancy.  Thus, reducing the output of redundancy would 
require reform of the committee system and its privileged role in the legislative 
process.  This fundamental point has been widely missed in prior analyses.  To 
date, Staudt is the only legal academic to recognize that, once one forms a 
normative view for or against administrative redundancy, implementation of 
that view generally requires structural changes within Congress.249 
Framing administrative redundancy as a problem of institutional reform 
makes clear that the two accounts of the congressional committee system 
considered in Part II point the reform project in opposite directions – with the 
distributive-theory account pointing toward wholesale institutional change and 
the informational-theory account pointing toward the status quo.  One might 
object that positive theories of legislative organization do not directly support 
normative positions about institutional reform.  But the argument here does not 
treat distributive theory and informational theory as encompassing normative 
positions.  Instead, the argument lays two normative assumptions on top of 
those positive theories; neither assumption is implied by the positive theories, 
but neither should be deeply controversial.  First, it is assumed that programs 
effecting negative-sum transfers from the public to favored constituents and 
interest groups are, all else equal, less desirable than programs not effecting 
such transfers.  Second, it is assumed that informational inefficiency is less 
desirable than informational efficiency, again with all else equal.   
On the assumption that distributive legislation is generally undesirable, the 
distributive-theory account of the committee system broadly justifies 
arguments for reducing administrative redundancy.  This conclusion follows 
regardless of whether the Friedman strand or the Landau strand provides the 
more accurate view about the effects of redundancy.  If the Friedman strand is 
correct, distributive theory’s account of the committee system only makes the 
story worse.  If the Landau strand is correct, redundancy still appears 
objectionable: Enhancing program reliability is not appealing where the 
programs are themselves the product of institutionalized logrolling.  Either 
way, the policy prescription would be for institutional reforms that reduce 
redundancy.250  Such reforms could include realigning committee jurisdictions 
 
249 Staudt, supra note 17, at 1214-22, 1239-49.  Staudt proposes two institutional 
changes.  First, she proposes a “Select Committee on Social Welfare” to oversee and 
coordinate most direct-spending and tax-expenditure programs.  Id. at 1240-43.  Second, she 
proposes the implementation of performance-based budgeting for the review and reform of 
administrative programs.  Id. at 1243-49.  Both proposals would invade the autonomy of the 
standing committees: either the new Select Committee on Social Welfare or the Budget 
Committee would be empowered to overrule the preferences of another committee on 
matters within that other committee’s jurisdiction.  In that respect, both proposals are similar 
to the realignment of committee jurisdiction that Staudt dismisses as “not likely to succeed 
in the near future, if ever.”  Id. at 1215. 
250 For a similar conclusion, see King, supra note 56, at 48 (“If turf is carved out so that 
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to reduce overlap and fragmentation, weakening committee parliamentary 
prerogatives, or even scuttling the committee system entirely.   
By contrast, on the assumption that improved legislative decision-making is 
desirable, informational theory implies a more optimistic view of the status 
quo.  Under informational theory, redundancy is a function of pursuing 
informational efficiency.  If the Landau strand is correct, the informational-
theory account makes redundancy, as a guarantor of reliability, appear in an 
even better light.  If the Friedman strand is correct, redundancy appears simply 
as an unfortunate by-product of a system generally aimed at improving the 
quality of legislative choices.  Although it generates waste, inefficiency, and 
irrationality, some degree of redundancy can be tolerated because of the 
informational benefits of the system that produces it.   
With both distributive costs and informational benefits in the balance, 
institutional reform should aim to optimize the trade-off.  The distributive-
theory account pulls toward reform that would compromise the informational 
efficiency of the committee system; the informational-theory account pushes 
against changes to the committee system, even if that system yields wasteful, 
inefficient, and irrational programs.  But certain reforms perhaps could both 
preserve much of the informational benefits and reduce the distributive costs.  
Two such approaches are set out here – one centered outside the committee 
system and one centered within it. 
A. Incorporating Outside Policy Expertise 
One approach to reducing administrative redundancy would formally 
incorporate external sources of policy expertise into the lawmaking process.  
The model here is the highly successful Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission used in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 to designate 
specific military facilities for closure.251  The problem addressed by the base-
closure process is essentially one of redundancy.  Near the end of the Cold 
War, Congress determined that the United States had too many domestic 
military facilities and that maintenance of the excess facilities was wasteful 
and inefficient.252  Decisions to close specific facilities presented a problem not 
of internal policy expertise but of distributive politics.253  Military facilities 
serve as centers for civilian economic activity, and closing any facility imposes 
concentrated costs on the state and congressional district in which the facility 
 
lawmakers can institutionalize logrolls and make it easier to distribute benefits back home . . 
. , then many of us might want to undermine those property rights in the name of the public 
interest.”). 
251 The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was established by the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 2901-2926, 
104 Stat. 1808, 1808-1824 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2391, 2687 (2006)). 
252 Edwin R. Render, The Privatization of a Military Installation: A Misapplication of the 
Base Closure and Realignment Act, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 245, 245, 250-51 (1997). 
253 Id. at 247-48. 
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is located.254  Unable to overcome the distributive obstacles on its own, 
Congress established a process under which an independent commission, 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,255 
reviews the Defense Secretary’s recommendations for facility closures256 and 
submits its own list of specific facilities to the President for approval or 
disapproval.257  The President, upon approving the recommendations, presents 
the list to Congress for approval or disapproval.258  Thus, recommendations to 
close specific facilities are made in the first instance by experts outside 
Congress, and the legislators must adopt or reject the recommendations 
without change. 
The base-closing approach offers several advantages.  Most generally, it 
reduces administrative redundancy while maximizing informational benefits 
and minimizing distributive costs.  Individuals with relevant expertise make 
the first move in the process by formulating recommendations for the President 
and Congress.  These outside experts become the agenda setters.  But the 
approach largely neutralizes the distributive motivations of individual 
legislators.  Judging from the repeated success of the base-closing process, a 
legislator who otherwise would resist the concentrated costs imposed by the 
closure of a specific military facility in her district or state apparently has more 
to lose from resisting an omnibus proposal to close dozens of military facilities 
across the country.  Even the distributive motivations of the executive branch 
are minimized.  The Defense Secretary compiles the initial list of facilities, but 
the commission may modify the list before presenting it to the President.259  
Although the President may disapprove the recommendations,260 that action 
would entail the political cost of overriding the commission’s independent 
determination and the policy cost of forgoing all base closures and 
realignments.  
Additionally, the procedural posture of the recommendations in Congress 
skews the outcome strongly in favor of congressional approval.  Unless 
Congress formally rejects the recommendations within forty-five days of 
receipt from the President, the recommendations have the force of law.261  That 
ensures that the recommendations are substantially more authoritative than 
other expert proposals that legislators routinely receive and routinely ignore.262  
 
254 Id. 
255 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 §§ 2902(c), 2912(d). 
256 Id. §§ 2903(c)-(d), 2914(a)-(d). 
257 Id. §§ 2903(d), 2914(d). 
258 Id. §§ 2903(e), 2904, 2908, 2914(e). 
259 Id. §§ 2903(d), 2914(d).  As provided in those sections, however, the commission 
does not have unfettered discretion in making changes to the Defense Secretary’s 
recommendations. 
260 Id. §§ 2903(e), 2914(e). 
261 Id. §§ 2904, 2908, 2914(e). 
262 Perhaps the most recent example of this is the recommendations of the National 
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At the same time, the opportunity for Congress to reject the recommendations 
provides a political check that, to date, has been sufficiently robust to make the 
process viable: legislators apparently understand that they have not delegated 
away all their authority over closing military facilities.  This general process – 
under which an independent commission of policy experts provides take-it-or-
leave it recommendations to the President, who in turn sends the take-it-or-
leave-it recommendations to Congress – may be the single most effective 
approach to addressing problems of administrative redundancy. 
There is reason to doubt, however, that Congress would extend the base-
closing approach to other policy areas.  The base-closing approach requires 
Congress in general and the committees of jurisdiction in particular to delegate 
agenda control to non-legislative actors, and it seems unlikely that legislators 
would surrender that authority for more than a very small number of policy 
issues.  Arguably, base closings present a particularly intractable problem that 
necessitates recourse to independent experts: the potential costs of base 
closings are so large and so concentrated that action might be extremely 
difficult through normal lawmaking.  But repealing or scaling back other 
redundant administrative programs often involves lower stakes.  With less to 
gain, on a legislature-wide basis, the surrender of legislative authority in 
exchange for fewer redundant programs probably would strike Congress and 
its standing committees as a bad proposition. 
Additionally, the base-closing approach presents the risk that, over time, 
congressional committees might suffer a degradation of policy expertise.  As 
informational theory argues, the prospect of distributive gains – establishing 
and maintaining administrative programs valued by constituents and interest 
groups – gives committee members incentives to invest in policy expertise for 
matters within their committee’s jurisdiction.  But the base-closing approach, if 
broadly applied, would shift much of the authority over administrative 
programs from the congressional committees to independent commissions.  If, 
for example, a commission of experts were empowered to present to Congress 
a set of all-or-nothing recommendations for eliminating redundant tax 
expenditures, the need for tax-policy expertise in the House Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would be diminished.  The tax 
committees might respond by investing as much or even more in their tax-
policy expertise, perhaps replacing eliminated tax expenditures with new ones; 
that, of course, would defeat the purpose of the entire exercise.  But the 
committees instead might respond by reducing their investment in tax-policy 
expertise, in which case the legislature would become more dependent on the 
executive branch and interest groups in understanding and forming tax policy. 
 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, which Congress never seriously 
considered.  See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE 
MOMENT OF TRUTH 12 (2010).   
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B. Separating Redundancy in Design from Redundancy in Implementation 
A second approach would exploit the distinction, explained above,263 
between redundancy in design and redundancy in implementation.  The 
implementation of redundant administrative programs should, if the Landau 
strand is correct, increase overall program reliability and should, as 
informational theory implies, improve congressional expertise about program 
effects.  But, if the Friedman strand and distributive theory are correct, the 
implementation of redundant programs is costly.  By contrast, the design of 
redundant administrative programs imposes lower costs but still allows 
congressional committees to cultivate overlapping policy expertise.  Reform, 
therefore, could encourage redundancy in program design but discourage 
redundancy in program implementation. 
The existing committee system promotes redundancy at both stages.  The 
fragmentation and overlap of committee jurisdictions facilitate redundancy in 
program design by allowing multiple committees to share proposal power over 
a single policy area.  For example, the Education and the Workforce 
Committee, the Agriculture Committee, the Science, Space, and Technology 
Committee, and the Ways and Means Committee all may report legislation in 
the House providing subsidies for post-secondary education.  But it is the 
parliamentary prerogatives that each chamber confers on its committees that 
facilitate redundancy in program implementation.  Those prerogatives enable 
the committees to push their proposals through to favorable action on the floor 
with minimal opportunity for other legislators to modify the proposals over 
committee objections.  Thus, even if the House as a whole would prefer to 
collapse four separate proposals for post-secondary education subsidies into a 
single program, the outsized power of the four committees makes that outcome 
less likely. 
Congress potentially could both capture the benefits of redundancy in design 
and avoid the costs of redundancy in implementation by preserving the 
jurisdictional boundaries of its committees while weakening the committees’ 
parliamentary prerogatives.  That approach would leave committee proposal 
power unchanged, allowing committees to continue reporting redundant 
programs consistent with their overlapping jurisdictions.  The approach would 
transfer power beyond the proposal stage from committees to the floor, 
allowing non-committee members greater opportunity to modify proposed 
programs over committee objections.  All else equal, that reform should lead to 
the enactment of fewer redundant programs.  At its best, the system would 
continue to produce the informational upside of redundancy in design; pre-
enactment competition among committees might even improve the quality of 
program design.  In fact, the system should encourage different committees to 
put competing program designs on the table simultaneously, improving the 
prospects that Congress will not have to evaluate redundant programs seriatim.  
 
263 See supra Part II.B. 
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But the system would reduce redundancy in implementation, thereby reducing 
the downside of administrative waste, inefficiency, and irrationality.264 
The broad range of committee parliamentary prerogatives presents a number 
of strategies for realizing this approach.  The House, for example, could repeal 
or modify its prohibition against non-germane floor amendments.  Under the 
existing germaneness rule, floor amendments must address the subject matter 
of the bill under consideration.265  That generally limits the ability of 
legislators to integrate committee proposals with existing administrative 
programs and, accordingly, limits the ability of the House to address 
redundancy in program implementation.  If the House were unwilling to repeal 
the germaneness rule, it could modify the rule to provide an exception for non-
germane amendments that target redundant administrative programs.  Along 
with repeal or modification of the germaneness rule, the House Rules 
Committee could report fewer closed rules, thereby opening the gates to anti-
redundancy floor amendments. 
Those strategies, however, present limitations and potential problems.  Most 
obviously, they would apply only in the House.  The Senate has no generally 
applicable germaneness requirement for floor amendments, and it does not use 
closed rules to structure floor consideration of pending measures.  More 
importantly, the germaneness rule and the closed rules serve the important 
purpose of bringing order to an otherwise unruly House floor.  With 435 
coequal members, an open-amendment process in the House can be extremely 
time-consuming at best and hopelessly chaotic at worst.  To complete their 
legislative agenda, House managers must have the ability to control floor 
proceedings, and that has pushed managers in the contemporary Congress to 
limit – rather than expand – the range of permissible amendments.266  In short, 
liberalizing the House amendment process, even if it would reduce 
administrative redundancy, would impose a genuine cost on the institution as a 
whole. 
 
264 Staudt argues that jurisdictional fragmentation under the existing legislative structure 
encourages competition among congressional committees, thereby improving legislative 
information and sparking innovation in program design.  See Staudt, supra note 17, at 1200, 
1219-20, 1227-28, 1230, 1235-36.  That argument seems misplaced.  The parliamentary 
prerogatives under the existing legislative structure allow committees with overlapping 
jurisdiction to bring proposals for redundant programs to the floor with little risk of 
modification through floor amendment.  There is, then, no need for committees to compete 
as long as the parliamentary prerogatives remain in place.  If, however, those prerogatives 
were weakened or removed such that the floor actively winnowed down recommendations 
for redundant programs, the committees might indeed have to compete in the manner 
suggested by Staudt. 
265
 House Rules XVI.7 provide: “No motion or proposition on a subject different from 
that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.”  Rules of the House 
of Representatives, R. XVI.7, H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 703 (2009). 
266 See Doran, supra note 89, at 1409-12. 
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Another – and possibly better – strategy for curbing the parliamentary 
prerogatives of congressional committees would be to change the composition 
of the ad hoc conference committees used to reconcile competing measures 
from the House and the Senate.  Under current practice, members of the 
standing committee that proposed a measure have disproportionate 
representation on the conference committee.267  That allows the proposing 
committee to remove any changes made by the floor over the committee’s 
objection.268  If they were more representative of the full chamber, conference 
committees might assert authority to weed out redundant administrative 
programs.  Perhaps even better, the composition of a conference committee 
could include members of a rival committee with overlapping jurisdiction, and 
the conference committee could be given a mandate from the full chamber not 
to report a final bill with redundant programs.  For example, a conference 
committee on any bill expanding tax expenditures or direct spending for post-
secondary education could include key members from both the tax committees 
and the education committees.  The conference committee would be instructed 
by its parent chambers either to resolve any redundancy between the pending 
measure and existing administrative programs or simply to let the measure die 
in conference. 
Institutional reform aimed at redundancy in implementation is not without 
potential drawbacks.  Even if narrowly targeted, this approach might 
nonetheless undermine the informational benefits of the committee system.  
Policy expertise can be complex and nuanced, and it derives in part from the 
review of ongoing administrative programs.  By holding oversight hearings 
and gathering testimony from executive-branch officials who administer 
programs and from non-governmental parties affected by programs, legislators 
gain important information about different approaches to implementing their 
policy objectives.269  Redundancy in the implementation of administrative 
programs allows Congress to experiment with different administrative 
strategies and to determine, for example, whether particular federal subsidies 
are better delivered through tax expenditures or through direct spending.  
Inevitably, part or all of that feedback would be lost under a reform approach 
that restricts redundancy to program design. 
Additionally, curbing the parliamentary prerogatives of congressional 
committees might also undermine the incentives of committee members to 
invest in policy expertise.  Acquisition and maintenance of specialized 
knowledge are costly.  Informational theory argues that, under the current 
institutional structure, committee members are willing to invest in policy 
expertise in part because they can expect outsized returns on matters within 
their committee’s jurisdiction.  For example, legislators on the House and 
 
267 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 215-18; Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 83, at 
97-100. 
268 DEERING & SMITH, supra note 27, at 218. 
269 See generally Listokin, supra note 207. 
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Senate labor committees acquire superior information about labor-management 
relations, and they may use that superior information to secure benefits for 
employees at the expense of employers or for employers at the expense of 
employees, depending on their electoral and policy goals.  But securing those 
outsized returns requires that the committees effectively shelter their legislative 
proposals from floor amendments that otherwise would move the proposals 
away from the committees’ preferred positions.  The parliamentary 
prerogatives currently in place help the committees resist unwelcome floor 
amendments, and weakening those prerogatives may weaken the informational 
incentives of committee members.  That outcome, obviously, would undermine 
informational efficiency.270 
There are, however, countervailing considerations.  Reducing redundancy in 
program implementation would reduce information about program operations, 
but it would not eliminate that information entirely.  Legislators could still 
experiment with different administrative options – they just could not run 
simultaneous experiments as freely as they do now.  Also, the point of 
institutional reform is to trade off institutional benefits against distributive 
costs.  Reducing program redundancy may involve a loss of useful 
information, but it also would curtail administrative waste, inefficiency, and 
irrationality.  The objective is to strike the right balance between informational 
benefits and distributive costs, not to avoid a loss of informational benefits in 
any event. 
The potential for undermining legislator incentives to invest in policy 
expertise is arguably a more serious concern, but it seems unlikely that those 
incentives would become weak enough to threaten the informational role of the 
committee system.  Encouraging redundancy in program design but blocking 
redundancy in program implementation effectively would move committees 
with overlapping jurisdictions toward a winner-take-all system.  Instead of the 
current structure, under which every committee making a proposal enjoys 
reasonable prospects of securing benefits for its constituents and favored 
interest groups, a structure that narrows redundant program proposals to a 
single enacted program would still provide the opportunity for outsized 
benefits to whichever committee prevails on the floor.  Moreover, if the 
winning committee’s benefits were scaled up, the ex ante incentives for the 
committee members should remain large enough to induce specialization even 
with a reduction in aggregate program costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Academic accounts generally evaluate administrative redundancy in strictly 
normative terms: Should legislators pursue or avoid redundancy when 
establishing and maintaining administrative programs?  Those normative 
accounts, which treat Congress as choosing or rejecting redundancy for its own 
 
270 Thanks to Dhammika Dharmapala for raising this point in comments on a draft of this 
Article.   
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sake, obscure the etiological relationship between legislative organization and 
redundancy.  Analysis of that relationship identifies redundancy as a non-
necessary but highly likely function of the congressional committee system, 
including the fragmentation and overlap of committee jurisdictions and the 
extensive parliamentary prerogatives that guarantee committees primary 
influence over policy outcomes.  No less importantly, the legislative-
organization account reveals the distributive costs and the informational 
benefits associated with administrative redundancy and suggests potential 
institutional reforms aimed at striking a better balance between them. 
 
